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∎ A culture war is being waged in Israel: over the identity of the state, its 
guiding principles, the relationship between religion and the state, and 
generally over the question of what it means to be Jewish in the “Jewish 
State”. 
∎ The Ultra-Orthodox community or Haredim are pitted against the rest of 
the Israeli population. The former has tripled in size from four to 12 per-
cent of the total since 1980, and is projected to grow to over 20 percent 
by 2040. That projection has considerable consequences for the debate. 
∎ The worldview of the Haredim is often diametrically opposed to that of 
the majority of the population. They accept only the Torah and religious 
laws (halakha) as the basis of Jewish life and Jewish identity, are critical 
of democratic principles, rely on hierarchical social structures with rabbis 
at the apex, and are largely a-Zionist. 
∎ The Haredim nevertheless depend on the state and its institutions for 
safeguarding their lifeworld. Their (growing) “community of learners” of 
Torah students, who are exempt from military service and refrain from 
paid work, has to be funded; and their education system (a central pillar 
of ultra-Orthodoxy) has to be protected from external interventions. These 
can only be achieved by participation in the democratic process. 
∎ Haredi parties are therefore caught between withdrawal and influence. 
Whilst protecting their community, they try to both combat tendencies 
that run counter to their conception of Jewishness as “defenders of the 
Jewish character of the state”, and to gain more importance within state 
and society for principles of religious law. This impetus to shape affairs 
is recent. 
∎ The Haredim are changing both state and society, and they in turn are 
changed by them. Responses from within the community to this fact 
range from calls for isolation to those for integration within the state to 
those for taking it over. 
∎ For Israel’s international partners, the Haredim’s growing influence will 
necessarily mean more negotiation, especially where liberal and emanci-
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Issues and Conclusions 
The Haredim as a Challenge for the 
Jewish State. The Culture War over 
Israel’s Identity 
Since the early 2000s, a domestic confrontation 
(which has accompanied the state since its founda-
tion) has intensified: the fight over the identity of 
Israel. Especially among Jewish Israelis, a “culture war” 
has developed, which gains trenchancy from the way 
in which normative questions are quickly linked to 
fundamental debates over the identity of the state. 
President Reuven Rivlin views this in the context of 
the emergence of a “new Israeli order”: for him, secu-
lar Zionism has lost its cohesive power, and Israel’s 
four “tribes” – secular and religious Zionists, Israeli 
Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox – are therefore nego-
tiating a new social order. The focal point of these 
debates continues to be the meaning of Israel as a 
“Jewish state”. 
The ultra-Orthodox or Haredim have a special role 
in these confrontations: within Israel’s already deeply 
divided society, they are the only Jewish movement 
that is not based on Zionism. They view themselves as 
non-modern, traditional Jews who represent authen-
tic Jewishness. 
This leads to tensions with both the state and 
mainstream society. On the one hand, the Haredim 
consider the state a threat to their identity. On the 
other hand, it serves them, as it does their Jewish 
fellow citizens, as a screen onto which to project their 
worldview. This has been evident in the political 
sphere particularly since the turn of the millennium, 
when confrontations over the special rights of the 
Haredim – such as their exemption from military 
service, and their educational autonomy – began to 
occupy the courts and enter into election campaigns. 
Simultaneously, the Haredim have steadily been driv-
ing out religious Zionists from their role as “preserv-
ers of the Jewish identity of the state”. Instead, the 
Haredim now try to entrench their own understand-
ing of religious orthodox principles within the state. 
This aspiration to shape affairs is new and turns 
the Haredim into exposed actors in a culture war that 
is not exclusively about them, but that is, often, 
about their influence and status within the state. This 
is particularly significant because the Ultra-Orthodox 
share of the Israeli population is rising disproportion-
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ately since they traditionally have large families: from 
four percent in 1980 to 12 percent today. By 2040 it is 
expected to grow to over 20 percent. 
 What do these developments mean for Israel? 
How are the Haredim changing politics, the economy 
and society, and what goals do they set themselves? 
What specifically do these confrontations concerning 
the identity of the state revolve around? What are 
the limits of ultra-Orthodox politics? And how is the 
growing importance of the Haredim within the state 
changing their community? 
Three areas of conflict are particularly relevant 
within this process of negotiation. First, the Jewish 
identity of the state, the new self-image of the Haredim, 
and the active shaping of the state by their political 
parties. This shaping consists inter alia of preventing 
or neutralising any form of normative (and especially 
liberal) constitution of the state or its key institutions 
that runs counter to the Haredi perspective. Here, 
the Haredim focus on pushing back the substantive 
liberal aspects of Israeli democracy in favour of a 
procedural democracy without normative basis. They 
also claim the prerogative to interpret the relationship 
between religion and state. This can be seen in their 
efforts to pre-empt any liberalisation or secularisa-
tion, and also their continuous attempt to push 
through their own convictions – for instance as con-
cerns resting on the Shabbat or the question of who 
is recognised as a Jew in Israel. 
The second area of conflict is the special rights of the 
Haredim community. A large part of the Israeli popu-
lation criticises the privileged treatment they receive 
at the expense of the majority. This particularly con-
cerns their exemption from military service and the 
state subsidies for about 50 percent of ultra-Orthodox 
adult males who are not engaged in paid work be-
cause of their Torah studies. For the Haredim, these 
are key elements of their milieu that must be pro-
tected against state intervention. The conflicts arising 
from this have repeatedly led to coalition crises or 
even new elections, but they also relate to the culture 
war and the associated question of which norms the 
state should use to set its priorities. 
The third area of conflict is primarily extra-parlia-
mentary and concerns issues of public normativity. When 
Haredim move into non-ultra-Orthodox neighbour-
hoods, this often leads to the inhabitants being pushed 
out and changes the function of public spaces – for 
instance when leisure facilities are replaced by reli-
gious facilities. Furthermore, there are confrontations 
over the restrictive rules within the ultra-Orthodox 
community regarding women, which are forced out 
of the public sphere in Haredim-dominated areas. 
The Haredim themselves are caught in a bind: 
on the one hand, they are trying to change the state; 
on the other, they fear being changed themselves 
by becoming entangled in politics and mainstream 
society. Their responses to this dilemma vary. Some 
call for isolation, others for integration into the state, 
and yet others for taking over the state. 
Where precisely the growing influence of the 
Haredim will lead remains to be seen. It is already 
clear, however, that the ultra-Orthodox catalyse those 
trends in Israel that weaken liberal conceptions of the 
state in favour of religious conceptions. This is evi-
dent inter alia in their efforts to replace the democratic 
quest for consensus with the rigid implementation of 
majority decisions. In coalitions dominated by the 
conservative right this is especially obvious. 
The growing power of the Haredim will have only 
indirect consequences on foreign policy. Apart from 
the diaspora, other countries are simply of no con-
sequence for the fundamentally community-minded 
ultra-Orthodox. Relations with the Jewish community 
in the US will presumably continue to deteriorate since 
its majority is liberal and/or belongs to the Reform 
movement. It is also likely that the Haredim will sup-
port rightwing/conservative positions concerning the 
Palestinian territories – though for pragmatic rather 
than religious reasons. 
For Israel’s partners, in the medium term the more 
significant participation of the Haredim in politics 
and society will mean that wherever issues of interest 
for the Haredim are touched upon, identifying com-
mon values and goals will become (even) more of a 
feat. On a variety of topics, dialogue will also become 
noticeably more difficult, especially where liberal and 
emancipatory policies are concerned. 
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Israel is currently engaged in a conflict over its iden-
tity. At stake is the issue of which norms and values 
should determine the nature of the state.1 The he-
gemony of secular Zionism is being eroded, and the 
composition of the population is changing in favour 
of the ultra-Orthodox. In Israel, a majority of whose 
inhabitants considers it a Jewish state, this demo-
graphic shift has consequences for its self-image: 
which conception of Jewishness (religious, national 
or cultural-philosophical) should play what part in 
the state? And what does it even mean to declare 
that the state is Jewish?2 
The process of differentiation and secularisation of 
the Jewish people throughout the so-called long nine-
teenth century created different Jewish identities: 
inter alia, progressive and reform; national; and also 
ultra-Orthodox. Since then, there has been disagree-
ment as to whether “being Jewish” should be con-
sidered primarily a national and political, cultural 
and philosophical or religious phenomenon, and 
as to how religious tradition should be dealt with: 
should it be secularised, reformed or retained un-
changed? These disputed issues ignited the so-called 
Jewish Kulturkampf (culture war), a term borrowed 
 
1 Yaacov Yadgar, Israel’s Jewish Identity Crisis: State and Politics 
in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2020); Simon Rabinovitch, Defining Israel: The Jewish State, 
Democracy, and the Law (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College 
Press, 2018). 
2 Menachem Mautner, “Protection of Liberal Rights amidst 
a ‘War of Cultures’ (Kulturkampf) between Secular and 
Religious Groups”, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 48 (2018): 
125–60; Gideon Katz, “The Israeli Kulturkampf”, Israel 
Affairs 14, no. 2 (2008): 237–54; Steffen Hagemann, Kultur-
kampf in Israel? Jüdische Identität und religionspolitische Konflikt-
felder (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Omar Kamil, 
“Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and his “Culture War” in Israel”, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs. 4, No. 4 (2000); 
Natan Sznaider disagrees: “Das Phantom des Kulturkampfs”, 
Jüdische Allgemeine, 16 November 2010. 
from a Christian German context that has for some 
time also been used in the Jewish context.3 In Israel 
the word is now used for the ongoing conflicts over 
these issues. 
Over time, the expression “culture war’ has be-
come more widely applied. Especially in the wake 
of the so-called cultural turn,4 it is now used in social 
sciences as part of conflict analysis to emphasise that 
not only class issues but also the worldview and cul-
tural practices specific to a milieu can be constitutive 
for social conflicts.5 The concept of cultural wars as 
commonly understood in the US (not to be confused 
with Huntingdon’s “Clash of Civilisations”) also 
articulates these developments.6 While the expression 
culture war is rarely employed entirely outside a reli-
gious context, today it often refers to confrontations 
over norms, values, and practices that are linked to 
the development of social-moral and political camps. 
In Israel, the well-established contentious issues 
are at stake, albeit under different circumstances and 
intensified for the state as a whole. The force of the 
Israeli culture war is linked to the changing hegemo-
nies within the state and the accompanying political 
logic. When the state of Israel was founded, social-
democratic republicanism predominated, favouring 
a system of government based on consociational 
democracy, within which the Labour Party tried to 
 
3 Shmuel Feiner, “A European Enlightenment in the 
Promised Land? The Jewish Kulturkampf at the Turn of the 
Twentieth Century”, The European Legacy – Toward New Para-
digms 25 (2020): 1–12. 
4 Michael Hechter, “From Class to Culture”, American Jour-
nal of Sociology 110, no. 2 (2004): 400–45. 
5 M. Rainer Lepsius, “Kulturelle Dimension der sozialen 
Schichtung”, in idem., Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen (Opla-
den: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), 96–116. 
6 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define 
America (New York: Basic Books, 1992). 
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integrate minorities through compromise.7 The most 
far-reaching compromise was the so-called Status Quo 
Agreement: in return for Haredim not internationally 
opposing the creation of the Zionist state, they were 
accorded religious-orthodox minimum standards 
within the state. These included religious personal 
status law (e.g. marriage, divorce, burials), kosher 
food in public institutions, the Shabbat as day of rest 
in Israel, and extensive autonomy in matters of edu-
cation.8 
The culture war has become 
the second most important 
domestic line of conflict. 
Likud’s 1977 election victory put an end not only 
to the social democratic era but also to the system’s 
character as a consociational democracy. Since then, 
a competitive democracy has emerged within a two-
bloc system in which parties that tend to be secular, 
leftwing (the ‘doves’ in the peace process) and liberal 
face the rather conservative to illiberal, religious and 
rightwing parties (‘hawks’). Competitive democracy 
does not aim for compromise but for asserting one’s 
own interests, and thus exacerbates social tensions. 
To this day, the predominant line of conflict in politi-
cal structuring and coalition building is how each 
bloc handles the occupied Palestinian territories. The 
left-leaning parliamentary parties call for Israel to 
withdraw from the occupied territories, the rightwing 
parties reject this.9 
Since the millennium, the contentious issues of the 
Israeli culture war have become the second most im-
portant line of conflict. 
Here, as the Israeli political scientists Asher Cohen 
and Bernard Susser observe, the nature and identity 
of the Israeli state are negotiated with increasing 
stridency,10 while positions on the relationship be-
tween state and religion are escalating: both the secu-
 
7 This was the case exclusively for Jewish Israelis, not 
Arab Israelis. 
8 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Religion and Political Accomodation in 
Israel (Jerusalem: The Floersheimer Institute for Political 
Studies, 1999). 
9 Peter Lintl, “Understanding Coalition Formation in Israel 
Party Positions and Cleavages in Light of the 2015 Elections”, 
Orient – German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture of the 
Middle East 56, no. 3 (2015): 27–35. 
10 Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, Israel and the Politics of 
Jewish Identity: The Secular-Religious (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2000). 
lar and the religious camp increasingly seek to im-
pose their own worldview as the only normatively 
right and legally binding one. This turn away from 
compromise is also mirrored in social trends.11 The 
(shrinking) secular majority12 is increasingly disengag-
ing from traditional religious practices such as the 
Shabbat rest and dietary laws (kashrut) while state, 
society and public standards are simultaneously being 
“religionised” or “Haredised”. There are even Hebrew 
neologisms for this process: ha’data‘ah (religionisation) 
and hitcharedut (Haredisation). 
This shows that the culture war is being waged 
especially, though not exclusively, between the grow-
ing group of Haredim and secular Zionist mainstream 
society.13 In 2017 77 percent of those surveyed consid-
ered this tension to be the most acute conflict between 
Jews.14 Ninety percent of secular Israelis believe that 
religion and state should be kept separate,15 whereas 
82 percent of Haredim expect the state to promote 
religious values and convictions.16 Such conflicts over 
hegemony often cause anxieties: large parts of Israeli 
society feel that the Haredim have too great an influ-
ence over their lives. The legal scholar Mordechai 
Kremnitzer even talks of a “hegemonial minority”.17 
 
11 Guy Ben-Porat, Between State and Synagogue: The Seculariza-
tion of Contemporary Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013); Yoav Peled, The Religionization of Israeli Society 
(London: Taylor & Francis, 2018); Shoshana Kordova, “Hared-
ization – In Israel, Gentrification Is about Religion, Not 
Class”, Tablet Magazine, 7 January 2011, https://tinyurl.com/ 
y2hsvhds (accessed 18 June 2020). 
12 According to a poll by the Haaretz newspaper, 56 per-
cent of Jewish Israelis see themselves as secular. Chemi 
Shalev, “Haaretz Poll: For Rosh Hashanah, a Picture of 
Israel’s Muddled Jewish Soul”, Haaretz, 9 September 2018, 
https://tinyurl.com/yd8lo2pe (accessed 18 June 2020). 
13 For an excellent take, see also: Eik Dödtmann, Die Chare-
dim in Israel im 21. Jahrhundert. Der Status quo zwischen Staat und 
Ultraorthodoxie (Berlin: be.bra, 2021, forthcoming). 
14 “2018 Israel Religion & State Index”, Hiddush News, 5 Sep-
tember 2018, https://tinyurl.com/ycjhfmsf (accessed 30 Septem-
ber 2020). 
15 Rafi Smith and Olga Paniel, The 2017 Israel Religion & State 
Index (Hiddush, 2017), http://rrfei.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/09/IRSI-2017-Final.pdf (accessed 30 September 2020). 
16 Pew Research Center, Israel’s Religiously Divided Society 
(New York, 2016), 195, https://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/ 
08/israels-religiously-divided-society/pf_2016-03-08_israel-01-
06/ (accessed 30 September 2020). 
17 Mordechai Kremnitzer, 70 Years of Status Quo (Jerusalem: 
The Israel Democracy Institute [IDI], 2 July 2017 [Hebr.]), 
https://www.idi.org.il/events/15975 (accessed 18 June 2020). 
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Israel’s Culture War: Genesis and Lines of Conflict
A large majority also complains about the unfair dis-
tribution of burdens and duties. Ninety percent of 
those surveyed in a poll saw the Haredim as an eco-
nomic burden.18 According to a study by Haifa Uni-
versity, Israel is moving towards becoming a “reli-
gious state”;19 concerns about a “takeover by the 
ultra-Orthodox” or a “Jewish version of Iran”20 or even 
the “obliteration”21 of secular Israelis are consequent-
ly growing. 
 
18 Shmuel Rosner and John Ruskay, eds., Jerusalem and 
the Jewish People: Unity and Division, (Jerusalem: Jewish People 
Policy Institute, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/yajf2ago (accessed 
18 June 2020). 
19 Yevgenia Bistrov and Arnon Sofer, Israel. Demography 
2010–2030: On the Way to a Religious State (Haifa: University 
of Haifa, 2012). 
20 Yossi Klein Halevi, Jewish Identities in Post-Rabin Israel 
(New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1998), 1. 
21 Ariana Melamed, “Television 2018: Orthodox Halachic 
Judaism, Haredisation, presented by Guy Pines and Oded 
Whilst the Haredim welcome the demographic 
development, they reject such scenarios as unwar-
ranted,22 seeing them as yet another attempt to turn 
the Haredim away from their principles and rob them 
of their identity.23 From their perspective, Israel is 
governed by a coercive secular regime.24 The Haredim 
allay the fears of the secular population. Knesset 
member Yitzhak Pindrus, for instance, emphasises 
 
Ben-Ami”, Haaretz, 3 January 2018 [Hebr.], https://tinyurl. 
com/y2jwmmjs (accessed 18 June 2020). 
22 Eliyahu Ackerman, “Once again the Haredim are to 
blame”, Mishpacha, 4 June 2016 [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/ 
ybgcn6gc (accessed 18 June 2020). 
23 Jaarimu Sod Institute, ed., “They Have Taken Crafty 
Counsel against thy People. On the Government’s Secret Plan 
to Change the Identity of the Ultra-Orthodox Community” 
(Jerusalem, 2018) [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/y7hz45qj 
(accessed 18 June 2020). 
24 Shmuel Rosner and Camil Fuchs, #IsraeliJudaism: Portrait 
of a Cultural Revolution (Jerusalem: The Jewish People Policy 




Sources: Ahmad Hleihel, Fertility among Jewish Women in Israel, by Level of Religiosity, 1979–2017, Working Paper Series no. 101 
(Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics [CBS] – Senior Department of Demography and Census, November 2017) [Hebr.], 
https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/pw/pw101/pw101.pdf (accessed 19 October 2020); Total Fertility Rates by Mother’s  
Religion 1948–2018 (Jerusalem: CBS, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/tq4dhcp (accessed 19 October 2020). 
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that the Haredim are primarily concerned with them-
selves since they constantly have to worry that fund-
ing for their schools might be discontinued.25 How-
ever, that is not entirely true. Moshe Gafni, chairman 
of the ultra-Orthodox party Degel HaTorah, concedes 
that there is a struggle over the relationship between 
religion and state, and warns that Israel is developing 
into a non-Jewish state.26 
 
25 Personal interview with Yitzhak Pindrus, 6 May 2018. 
26 Shirit Avitan Cohen, “I don’t want a halakhic state, I 
want the Status Quo”, Makor Rishon, 30 August 2019 [Hebr.], 
https://tinyurl.com/y24on7cx (accessed 18 June 2020). 
Demography as a Key to Power? 
With an average of 7.1 children per woman, the 
Haredim are the fastest growing population segment 
in Israel by some way. And Israel already easily tops 
all other OECD countries with an average birth rate 
of 3.1 children per woman.27 
There were about 35,000 to 45,000 Haredim28 in 
Israel when it was founded in 1948; seventy years 
later, with consistently high birth rates, they are one 
 
27 OECD Data, “Population”, in OECD Data Website, 2019, 
https://data.oecd.org/pop/population.htm (accessed 22 June 
2020). 
28 Alon Tal, The Land Is Full (New Haven: Yale University 




Source: Table A/3: Population 1, by Population Group, Age and Gender, 2018 (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2018) [Hebr.], 
https://www.idi.org.il/media/11668/a0318.xlsx (accessed 19 October 2020). 
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million. That makes them about 12 percent of the 
total population. Migration waves do influence the 
number of Haredim as well, but far fewer immigrants 
have been integrated in the ultra-Orthodox community 
than into the national religious, traditional religious 
or secular communities. The statistics also show there 
is potential for further growth: the younger the popu-




Source: Table A/1: Population Estimates by Population Group and Age, Estimate 2009 und Forecast 2017–2065 (Jerusalem: 
Israel Democracy Institute, 2018) [Hebr.], https://www.idi.org.il/media/13661/d0219.xlsx (accessed 19 October 2020). 
Israel’s Culture War: Genesis and Lines of Conflict 
SWP Berlin 
The Haredim as a Challenge for the Jewish State 
December 2020 
12 
Forecasts therefore assume a largely unchecked 
continuation of this trend.29 According to Israel’s 
Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of Haredim 
could more than double by 2037, to 2.3 million, if 
the birth rate stays roughly at the level of the past 40 
years. Every fourth Jewish Israeli (24 percent) would 
then be ultra-Orthodox. Their share in the overall po-
pulation would be 19 percent. By 2065 the Haredim 
could even total almost 6.5 million of the 20 million 
Israelis.30 
Not all Haredim lastingly stay true to their origins. 
More recent studies claim that between ten and 18 
percent of ultra-Orthodox Jews of an age cohort leave 
their community.31 Whether this will really put 
the brakes on the demographic development of the 
Haredim remains to be seen. Thus far, these argu-
ments are gainsaid by the fact that the demographic 
development of the Haredim has occurred exactly 
as the Central Bureau of Statistics first calculated in 
2012. 
The general trend, however, will continue – and 
thus too the need, both macro-economic and socio-
political, to integrate the ultra-Orthodox more closely 
into Israeli society than has been the case thus far. 
Conversely, however, this integration also means that 
their convictions will increasingly enter into society, 
which will intensify the normative issue in the cul-
ture war. To overstate it: the majority can only hope 
that the Haredim will adapt. Conversely, Haredi 
efforts to make the state more religious are in them-
selves a sign that they are prepared to integrate into 
 
29 Uzi Rebhun et al., Demographic Trends in Israel (Jerusalem: 
The Metzilah Center, 2009); Bistrov and Sofer, Israel. Demog-
raphy 2012–2030 (see note 19); Dan Ben David, ed., State of 
the Nation Report. Society, Economy and Policy in Israel 2009 (Jeru-
salem: Taub Center, 2010), 222 ff. 
30 Arie Paltiel et al., “Longterm population projection 
2009–2059”, Senior Department of Demography and 
Census of the CBS [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/y8qh56zg 
(accessed 18 June 2020); Sophia Peran, “Forecast of 
Population Development 2015–2065”, Senior Department 
of Demography and Census of the CBS, 2018 [Hebr.], https:// 
tinyurl.com/y6yvyb9d (accessed 18 June 2020). 
31 Alex Weinreb and Nachum Blass, Trends in Religiosity 
among Jewish Population in Israel (Jerusalem: Taub Center, May 
2018), https://tinyurl.com/y5rs8ra7 (accessed 18 June 2020); 
Dan Ben-David, Survey/In Israel they learn book-keeping (Tel Aviv: 
Shoresh Institute, 2019), 2 f. [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/ 
y2ta9jy2 (accessed 18 June 2020). 
the state and open their community up to it.32 In that 
sense, the political and societal conflicts currently 
taking place in Israel really are the contractions of a 
“new Israeli order”, in which the Haredim continue 
to gain in importance. 
 
32 Aharon Rose, “In a Permanent Spiritual Oscillation”, 
Eretz Acheret, July 2001 [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/y3lcx5zd 
(accessed 18 June 2020). 
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Alongside the religious Zionists, the Haredim are 
one of the two main branches of Orthodox Judaism 
in Israel. The ultra-Orthodox include the two tradi-
tions of European (Ashkenazi) origin – the so-called 
“Lithuanians” and the Hasidic Jews – as well as the 
non-European, Sephardic Haredi. Within these three 
main groups are multiple subgroups – especially 
among the Hasidic Jews. There is also a small minor-
ity of explicitly anti-Zionist groups, such as Edah 
HaChareidis and Neturei Karta, which reject the state 
of Israel, do not vote, and refuse all state funding.33 
The clear majority (more than 90 percent) of Haredim, 
however, is a-Zionist. In practical terms, this means 
that they are neutral towards Zionism up to a point 
and welcome the existence of the state, but reject 
any influence over their way of life. Politically, the 
Haredim are organised into parties that correspond to 
their main religious currents. The party of the Hasidic 
Haredim, Agudat Yisrael, has formed a parliamentary 
group with Degel HaTorah (the party of the “Lithua-
nians”), United Torah Judaism (UTJ); the Sephardic 
Haredim have joined together in Shas. Support within 
the ultra-Orthodox community is high: they are com-
munity parties par excellence.34 Voting for the ultra-
Orthodox parties among the Haredim progressively 
declined from 93.3 percent in 1999 to 82.9 in 2015 
(and participation in elections from 91.8 percent to 
84.4 percent), which is linked to the afore-mentioned 
 
33 There are also Haredi fringe groups located at the mar-
gins of society, such as Breslav or Habad Hasidim, which are 
not necessarily represented by the Haredi parties. Especially 
Habadniks are known to vote for extreme right-wing reli-
gious parties like Otzma Yehudit. 
34 On their genesis, see Daniel Mahla, Orthodox Judaism 
and the Politics of Religion: From Prewar Europe to the State of Israel 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 159–84. 
shifts in diversification and integration. However, 
after intensive election campaigns, in the elections 
of April and September 2019, the parties were once 
again able to garner over 90 percent of the ultra-
Orthodox vote.35 Despite many internal differences, 
this remarkably high level of approval enables them 
to be largely united in public. 
They combine a critical view of modern values, 
norms and political principles, and reject all non-
Jewish influence. This attitude sets the Haredim apart 
from all other Jewish movements. What is key for 
the ultra-Orthodox is a worldview based on the laws 
revealed by God (the halakha) and their traditional 
interpretation (for instance in the Talmud). The rules 
and laws derived from these often concern the min-
utest details of life and are, for the Haredim, an expres-
sion of their alliance with God and the basis for exist-
ence of the Jewish people. Conforming to them is 
thus “the essence of the nation’s task, purpose and 
right to exist”.36 
The Haredim see themselves as the last current in 
Judaism that exclusively adheres to values from Jewish 
tradition and religious principles. They tend to equate 
ultra-orthodoxy with Jewishness: for them, all other 
variants are illegitimate deviations, and rejected. 
 
35 Andrea Tavkov, “Haredim only vote for ultra-Ortho-
dox parties? Forget it, the world has moved on since 1999”, 
Globes, 1 April 2019 [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/y4s5zf28 
(accessed 18 June 2020); Shahar Ilan, “A Bonus for the Hare-
dim Due to High Election Participation: 2 Mandates”, Cal-
calist, 24 February 2020 [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/yyh4z5rw 
(accessed 18 June 2020). 
36 Rabbi Shmuel Jakobovits, Jewish Solidarity: Antidote to 
Assimilation. Selected Essays of a Haredi Spokesman (Jerusalem: 
The Harav Lord Jakobovits Torah Institute of Contemporary 
Issues, 2004), 21. 
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Torah Studies, Segregation and 
Strict Hierarchies 
The lived practice of Torah studies is the basis of 
ultra-Orthodox society. It is the predominant part 
of its education system, which – though state 
financed – only marginally takes into account in 
its religious schools secular subjects such as mathe-
matics, Hebrew, geography or the natural sciences.37 
In fact, state inspections of curricula are widely ob-
structed by the Haredim. This is remarkable and 
internationally unique: the state pays for religious 
private schools but has virtually no influence over 
the content of their lessons.38 Moreover, although 
the schools and textbooks do impart solidarity with 
Jewish fellow citizens as Jews, they also depict them 
as a potential threat to ultra-Orthodox identity.39 This 
striking educational autonomy was pushed through 
by the Haredi parties. 
Relying on those parties’ political influence is also 
the extent to which adult ultra-Orthodox men can 
pursue Torah studies, ideally fulltime – an ideal that 
has crystallised under the premise of torato omanuto 
(roughly: the Torah is his calling). Post-Holocaust 
generations – the Holocaust having decimated the 
Haredim to a vanishingly small minority – have 
continued with the self-image of being the last pre-
servers of Jewish tradition and divine truth. The 
reconstruction of the world destroyed during the 
Holocaust was placed under the leitmotif: “We have 
nothing left but the Torah.”40 To this day, the focus 
of the parties’ political efforts is therefore on main-
taining and expanding a society that revolves around 
 
37 Mirjam Künkler and Hanna Lerner, “A Private Matter? 
Religious Education and Democracy in Indonesia and Israel”, 
British Journal of Religious Education 38, no. 3 (2016): 279–307 
(292). 
38 Gila Stopler, “The Ultra-Orthodox Community in Israel 
and the Right to an Exclusively Religious Education”, in 
Susanna Mancini et al., Constitutional Secularism in an Age 
of Religious Revival (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
311–25. 
39 Eldad J. Pardo and Tehila Gamliel, Haredi Textbooks in 
Israel. Reinforcing the Barricades (Jerusalem: IDI, 2017). 
40 Benjamin Brown, “From political separatism to cultural 
entrenchment – Chazon Ish and the formation of Haredi 
Judaism in Eretz Israel”, in Mordechai Bar-On and Zvi Zame-
ret, On Both Sides of the Bridge. Religion and State in the Early Years 
of Israel (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben Tzvi, 2002), 363–412 
(398 f.) [Hebr.]. 
studying the Torah. This “society of learners”41 is the 
framework of the Haredi world, but also results in 
around 50 percent of ultra-Orthodox men choosing 
to be out of work and dependent on state support. 
Protecting the ultra-Orthodox 
world is one of the main goals of 
political efforts. 
The separate school system is also a means of “cul-
tural entrenchment”, as one of the leading experts on 
the Haredim, Benjamin Brown, calls it.42 What under-
pins this isolation in a refuge from the outside world 
is the worry that modern secular Israeli culture and 
its protagonists could negatively influence the ultra-
Orthodox community. For instance, the non-Orthodox 
conception of freedom is seen as an estrangement 
from religious laws, which can threaten the integrity 
of the community. 
The majority of Haredim therefore prefer to live 
in areas that, inter alia, strictly respect the Shabbat, 
have kosher food on sale, and renounce the (in their 
eyes) morally dubious services of cinema, theatre, and 
the like. Perspectives on sexuality and gender roles 
are also extremely restrictive. Contact between men 
and women is strictly regulated and minimised as 
much as possible. 
How large the gap can be between the Haredim 
and the rest of Israeli society has been demonstrated 
during the Covid pandemic. When the military 
organised the lockdown in the ultra-Orthodox town 
of Bnei Brak in spring 2020, soldiers were given 
Yiddish-Hebrew dictionaries since still not all Hare-
dim speak Modern Hebrew well.43 In autumn 2020, 
infection rates are rising particularly in ultra-Ortho-
dox communities. Their members live partly in iso-
lation, but space is limited. The combination of 
mistrust of the state authorities with the necessity 
(considered existential by the Haredim) to continue 
studying the Torah and visiting the synagogue is pre-
cisely what created situations in which large num-
 
41 Menachem Friedman, “The Ultra-Orthodox and Israeli 
Society”, in Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges, ed. Keith 
Kyle and Joel Peters (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 177–201 
(185). 
42 Brown, “From political separatism” (see note 40). 
43 Yaniv Kubovich, “Israel Gives Yiddish Dictionaries to 
Soldiers Posted in Haredi Coronavirus Hot Spot”, Haaretz, 
5 April 2020, https://tinyurl.com/txr966h (accessed 18 June 
2020). 
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bers of people came into contact with each other 
without following health precautions. 
In a society where conformity of one’s actions to 
religious laws is decisive in every situation, rabbis 
have a key role. A handful of leading rabbis – the 
so-called poskim (deciders) – function as guides on 
unresolved questions, but also as advisors on daily 
matters (e.g. on marriage, profession, health, 
finances, or the use of modern technologies such 
as the Internet or smartphones). They also have to 
answer more fundamental questions pertaining to 
modern science, e.g. whether dinosaurs are kosher 
(no)44 and whether Haredim are allowed to believe in 
the Copernican system (yes).45 The poskim’s answers 
are not always unequivocal, and their verdicts are 
not always able to halt developments within ultra-
Orthodox society. For example, Internet user numbers 
are growing constantly despite the rabbis’ many 
warnings about its dangers for the spiritual integrity 
of the community: while in 2008 only 28 percent of 
Haredim stated that they surf the Internet, 11 years 
later it was already 49 percent.46 But despite the fact 
that not all warnings and restrictions are implement-
ed, rabbis’ decisions are believed to set the norm for 
both the public and private lives of the Haredim. Ac-
cording to a poll, 77 percent follow rabbinical direc-
tives, even when they contradict their own convic-
tions.47 
Politics is not exempt from this – on the contrary. 
A small circle of rabbis who possess so-called “Knowl-
edge of the Torah” (Da’at Torah)48 functions as a final 
recourse for all Haredi political decisions. They have 
the last word in the “Council of Great Torah Sages” 
(for Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah) and the “Coun-
 
44 Ari L. Goldman, “Religion Notes”, The New York Times, 
14 August 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/14/us/ 
religion-notes.html (accessed 18 June 2020). 
45 Josh Waxman, “Is Rav Kanievsky Now a Heliocentrist?” 
Parashablog, 18 August 2009, http://parsha.blogspot.com/ 
2009/08/is-rav-kanievsky-now-heliocentrist.html?m=1 
(accessed 18 June 2020). 
46 Gilad Malach and Lee Cahaner, 2019 Statistical Report on 
Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel: Highlights (Jerusalem: IDI, 2020), 
https://en.idi.org.il/articles/29348 (accessed 18 June 2020). 
47 Shaharit, Political Possibilities. Mapping a Common Good 
Majority (Tel Aviv, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/yyl3vupy 
(accessed 18 June 2020). 
48 Benjamin Brown, “The Da’at Torah Doctrine: Three 
Phases”, in Yehyada Amir, The Path of the Spirit. The Eliezer 
Schweid Jubilee, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Van Leer, 2005), 537–600 
[Hebr.]. 
cil of the Torah Sages” (for Shas) over all political 
activities by the parties. But here too the hierarchical 
structure ultimately depends on voluntariness and 
the pressure towards social conformity; beyond that, 
there are no means to enforce the rabbis’ verdicts. 
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The relationship between the Haredim and Israel as 
a Jewish and democratic state is complex. It moves 
between a theoretical theological perspective of rejec-
tion and pragmatic adaptation, between criticism 
of the state order and values of Zionist mainstream 
society and continuing integration into the Israeli 
state. Both elements – the Jewish and the demo-
cratic – pose a challenge for the ultra-Orthodox. 
From their perspective, the fundamental question 
is how the state behaves towards Jewish tradition. 
In this respect, there is a clear trend: theoretical argu-
ments for rejecting the state are being eclipsed. In-
stead, the state – which allows Jews a religious life 
after all – is increasingly viewed in a positive light 
A Jewish State? 
To be a genuinely Jewish state in the eyes of the Hare-
dim, Israel would have to be built on the principles 
of the Torah and halakha, in other words, be quasi 
theocratic. Haredi leaders had demanded this before 
the foundation of Israel – knowing full well that 
their request would be rejected.49 But since the state 
is not halakhic, the Haredim must, to this day, deal 
with a state that does not correspond to their inter-
pretation of Jewishness. In the ultra-Orthodox world-
view (hashkafa), there are three predominant ways 
of accounting for this situation. First: the state is a 
 
49 Moshe Blau, “Programme of ultra-Orthodox Demands 
Concerning the Constitution of the Jewish State”, in Isaac 
Levin, Material for the Preparation of a Constitution for the Jewish 
State on a Religious Basis (New York, 1948), 22–27 [Hebr.]. 
modern Zionist enterprise aiming to transform the 
Jewish people “into a people like all other peoples” 
and to end the exile imposed by God through an act 
of human self-empowerment. The state of Israel is 
thus based on a heretical interpretation of Judaism, 
an abandoning of God and Torah.50 Two: the state is 
a purely bureaucratic apparatus, which is evaluated 
positively or negatively depending on its behaviour 
towards the Haredim or Judaism.51 This conception 
also emphasises their distance to the state and is 
often paraphrased as a spiritual continuation of 
Jewish exile (“exile in the Holy Land”).52 Third: the 
state, while having no theological significance, is 
recognised as a state for and by Jews, which increases 
its utilitarian relevance. It can be a “safe haven” and 
allow the Jewish people to maintain the foundations 
of Jewish tradition and religious laws.53 The expecta-
 
50 Joseph Friedensohn, “A Concise History of Agudath 
Israel”, in Yaakov Rosenheim Memorial Anthology (New York: 
Orthodox Library, 1968), 23; Rabbi Elhonon Wasserman, 
Epoch of the Messiah (Jerusalem: Ohr Elchonon Publications, 
1977). 
51 The leading Rabbi of early statehood, “Chason Ish”, par-
ticularly embodied this view; see Brown, “From Political 
Separatism” (see note 40). 
52 Moshe Scheinfeld, The Exile of the Divine Presence in Israel, 
October 1948 [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/yxzu4qr7 (accessed 
18 June 2020). 
53 The prominent Lithuanian-Jewish rabbi Menachem 
Shach (1898–2001) emphasised: “An individual who defiles 
the Shabbat may have excuses. […] But what about those 
who have all the means of the state at their disposal? […] Are 
we not talking about free Jews here, in our state, the state of 
Jewish and/or Democratic? 
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tion that the state will implement religious principles 
tends to rise accordingly. 
These three approaches are not mutually exclusive; 
rather, they are weighted according to the context. 
For the mainstream among the Haredim, criticism 
of the state is theologically justified, but has become 
noticeably blurred to a sort of “non-Zionist Zionism”54 
that allows them to support the state and simulta-
neously keep their ideological distance. The Mizrahi 
Haredim of Shas are particularly successful in uniting 
statehood, a limited acceptance of Zionism and the 
fundamentals of ultra-Orthodoxy.55 Today, the most 
mordant criticism is aimed at the secular government 
and political attempts to exert influence over the 
ultra-Orthodox. The Haredim no longer feel that their 
very existence is threatened, but they still view them-
selves as a population under “external governance”.56 
Despite all political rapprochement, the demar-
cation from the Jewish-Zionist mainstream society 
remains in place: a clear majority of ultra-Orthodox 
do not describe themselves as Zionists, and only a 
third identify with the state.57 Simultaneously as 
many as 65 percent now consider the state of Israel 
important for the long-term survival of the Jewish 
people,58 and 89 percent believe there is an obligation 
on the Haredim to help shape the state’s Jewish char-
acter.59 
A Democratic State? 
The situation is similar as regards Israel’s democratic 
system. De facto, the Haredim accept democracy as a 
political system, but primarily for pragmatic reasons. 
From a religious-law perspective, they are sceptical 
 
Israel?” Elazar Menachem Shach, Michatvim uMaamarim, 
vols. 1 and 2 (Bnei Brak: no publ., 1987/88), p. לו [Hebr.]. 
54 Benjamin Brown, “Part Two: Haredi Judaism and the 
State”, in Yedidia Stern et al., When Judaism Meets the State 
(Jerusalem: IDI, 2015), 79–268 (100) [Hebr.]. 
55 Nissim Leon, Mizrahi Ultra-Orthodox Judaism and National-
ism in Israel (Jerusalem: Van Leer, 2016) [Hebr.] 
56 Jakobovits, Jewish Solidarity (see note 36], 67. 
57 A further third does not identify with the state while 
the final third is ambivalent. Shaharit, Survey of the Ultra-
orthodox Community (Tel Aviv, 2014), https://tinyurl.com/ 
yxp9fduc (accessed 18 June 2020). 
58 That figure is over 90 percent for all other Jewish cur-
rents in Israel: Pew Research Center, Israel’s Religiously Divided 
Society (see note 16). 
59 Shaharit, Political Possibilities (see note 47). 
about democratic principles. “Democracy”, as Mena-
chem Shach (1898–2001) wrote, who was probably 
the most influential rabbi in the history of Israel, “is 
treif [unkosher], and its intent is to uproot the people 
of Israel from its tradition”.60 From an ultra-Ortho-
dox/halakhic perspective, this is entirely consistent: 
democratic principles cannot be relevant in a Jewish 
community that is guided by rabbis. “Every govern-
ment”, an ultra-Orthodox author declared when Israel 
was created, “that boasts its sovereignty and legis-
lative authority over the Torah is illegal, even if it was 
voted in by the whole people.”61 
Nevertheless, Haredi majority leaders and their po-
litical parties participate in the Israeli parliament – 
only the strictly anti-Zionist minority has remained 
outside – so as to influence the way in which the 
state decides the fate of the Haredim.62 They operate 
within the political system, even though they con-
sider it illegitimate, to avert greater damage for the 
community. ‘The Haredi general public plays the 
democratic game in its ‘foreign relations’ with the 
non-Haredi general public because it has no choice, 
but it does so ex post facto and not a priori”, Benja-
min Brown writes. “It neither espouses any principles 
from democracy nor tries to adopt it.”63 The ultra-
Orthodox journalist Eli Lipshitz confirmed this view 
in December 2019, writing, “The Haredim are not 
democrats, and they are definitely not liberals.”64 
The Haredi approach to democracy is utilitarian. 
Despite their pragmatism, whenever democracy con-
tradicts ultra-Orthodox principles or even questions 
the sovereignty of the Torah, they set clear boun-
daries. In a word: liberal values such as equality, free-
dom or individual autonomy are irreconcilable with 
focusing on a Torah-based collective that trusts in 
the advice of rabbis. When asked whether the state 
should be Jewish or democratic, or which of the two 
attributes they would prefer, 84 percent of Haredim 
answer “Jewish”. Twelve percent favour “Jewish and 
 
60 Elazar Menachem Shach, Michtavim uMaamarim, vol. 5 
(Bnei Brak: no publ., 1994/5), קכד [Hebr.].  
61 Scheinfeld, The Exile (see note 52). 
62 Rafael Grozovsky, The Problems of Time (Bnei Brak: Nezach, 
1959), 15 [Hebr.]. 
63 Benjamin Brown, Trembling at the Word of the People Haredi 
Critique of Israeli Democracy (Jerusalem: IDI, 2012), 40 f. [Hebr.]. 
64 Eli Lipshitz, “The Attitude of the Haredim towards the 
State of Israel: A Road Map”, Zarich Iyun, December 2019 
[Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/y5a7cfov (accessed 18 June 2020). 
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democratic” and only two percent “democratic”.65 In 
a different survey, more than 80 percent declared 
themselves in favour of halakha as the legal basis for 
the state;66 in a further poll, it was even 86 percent.67 
Moreover, 83 percent believe that halakha should pre-
vail over democracy in areas of contention.68 
Focusing on the Jewish Identity of 
the State 
What to do, then? The issue of what use to make of 
the state is a dilemma for the Haredim. Their inter-
pretation of Jewish tradition provides no answer. 
The ideal of a state based on Torah and halakha is no 
immediate political goal for two reasons. First, as a 
minority, the Haredim are aware that they could not 
push this ideal through politically, and they do not 
want to impose the halakhic lifestyle on the secular 
population. From the perspective of the ultra-Ortho-
dox elite, that would be neither practical nor moral 
nor legitimate under religious law.69 The Haredim do 
not consider it their political task to get secular Jews 
to “return” to religion, at least not at the moment.70 
Moshe Gafni (UTJ) confirmed this in the Knesset: 
“I want the state of Israel to become a halakhic state. 
But I know that I don’t want it now.”71 Second, the 
Torah Sages have made no declarations as to what the 
state of Israel ought to look like if the minority was 
the majority and vice versa. They have developed no 
political utopia for it. This is mostly due to the fact 
that the rabbis consider modern concepts such as 
ideology and statehood untranslatable into the logic 
of the halakha, which was shaped by Jewish exile, 
and perceive any attempt in this direction to be 
 
65 Israeli Democracy Index 2018 (Jerusalem: IDI, 2019), 72 ff., 
https://tinyurl.com/y24fc9l9 (accessed 18 June 2020). 
66 Shaharit, Survey of the Ultra-orthodox Community 
(see note 57). 
67 Pew Research Center, “Large Divide among Jews on 
Whether Halakha Should be State Law” (New York, 1 March 
2016), https://tinyurl.com/yx9vcnzj (accessed 18 June 2020). 
68 Idem., Israel’s Religiously Divided Society (see note 16). 
69 Brown, Trembling at the Word of the People (see note 63), 44. 
70 Yated Neeman Editorial, “Chareidi Politics Is Just Politics 
by Chareidim”, Chareidi, 7 July 2004, https://tinyurl.com/ 
y2cfg7yj (accessed 18 June 2020). 
71 20
th
 Knesset, 281st Session, 29 November 2017 [Hebr.], 
https://tinyurl.com/y2782fgm (accessed 18 June 2020). 
heretical.72 In a rare statement, Rabbi Horowitz from 
the Torah Council of Agudat Yisrael has publicly 
declared that he was glad that the Haredim were not 
the majority in Israel since he did not know how to 
administer a state whilst also having the responsibil-
ity of adhering to the Torah.73 
Yet the growth of Haredi political power has ad-
vanced their own integration into the state and politi-
cal system. This has changed their perception of their 
role within the state. They increasingly view them-
selves as the guardians of the Jewish identity of the 
state and its Jewish citizens – a role from which they 
have effectively displaced the religious Zionist parties. 
Since the turn of the millennium, but especially since 
the 2010s, the Haredim’s will to shape the Jewish reli-
gious aspects of state identity has been noticeably 
growing. “We are here,” in the words of Knesset mem-
ber Yaakov Asher (UTJ) in 2017, “to safeguard the 
Jewish character of the state.”74 Gafni also acknowl-
edges “a dramatic change. We no longer focus only 
on ourselves, everything is of interest to us now […]. 
We cannot withdraw from law-making and govern-
ment decisions that might ultimately hurt the state 
of Israel as a Jewish state.”75 The most assertive recent 
formulation of this aspiration was by Moshe Abutbol 
(Shas) in May 2020. During a memorial session for 
Theodor Herzl, founder of political Zionism, he stated 
in Parliament: “What is really important to us Hare-
dim is the Jewish character of the state, which should 
not only be a Jewish state but a Jewish state according 
to our worldview.”76 
The “Jewish character of the state” covers a broad 
spectrum, ranging from details of personal conduct to 
 
72 Benjamin Brown, “Deducing God’s Will from Reality – 
the Controversy over the Value of History in Determining 
the Direction of Judaism”, in One Hundred Years of Religious 
Zionism, ed. Avi Sagi and Dov Schwartz, vol. 3 (Jerusalem: 
Bar Ilan University Press, 2002), 77–106 (94) [Hebr.]. 
73 Mendi Grossman, “The Bostoner Admor: I Am Afraid 
of a Halakhic State”, Maariv, 3 March 2015 [Hebr.], http:// 
tinyurl.com/oh5j54f (accessed 18 June 2020). 
74 Jakov Grudka, “The Supermarket Storm. ‘A Secular Man 
Cried on the Phone to Me’”, BeChadrei Haredim, 28 December 
2017 [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/y3fzu635 (accessed 18 June 
2020). 
75 Gafni in conversation with Cohen, “I don’t Want a 
Halakhic State” (see note 26). 
76 Ari Kalman, “Golan to Abutbol: ‘If it Was Up to the 
Haredim – the State Would Not Have Neen Founded”, 
BeChadrei Haredim, 4 May 2020 [Hebr.], https://www.bhol.co.il/ 
news/1097007 (accessed 18 June 2020). 
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fundamental features of the constitution. Yet the 
ultra-Orthodox perspective is not revolutionary.77 
What is currently at stake is not the realisation of an 
ultra-Orthodox state, but a process of transformation, 
albeit without a clearly defined goal that might guide 
Haredi actions. Since the Torah state remains a theo-
retical abstraction, the Haredim’s will to shape the 
state is limited to embedding religious principles and 
religious life even more firmly in it than before. 
 
77 This change corresponds to the transition from “world 
creator” to “world transformer” as described by Almond 
et al. in their categorisation of strict religious movements. 
Gabriel A. Almond et al., Strong Religion. The Rise of Fundamen-
talisms around the World (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2003), 145–90. 
Objectives and Strategies of the Ultra-Orthodox Parties 
SWP Berlin 
The Haredim as a Challenge for the Jewish State 
December 2020 
20 
Three topics are the focus of ultra-Orthodox politics. 
First, traditional clientele politics, in this case essen-
tially to fund the Haredi community and protect it 
from the state. This is carried out primarily through 
coalition agreements78, legal amendments and 
motions, combined with the strategic filling of politi-
cal posts. This has been particularly obvious in the 
government that has been in office since 2020: along-
side the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Housing 
and Construction and the Ministry of Religious Ser-
vices, the Haredim secured the posts of deputy minis-
ter in the Ministries of Finance, Social Affairs, Educa-
tion, and Transport and Road Safety. Some of these 
deputy positions are explicitly connected to respon-
sibility for ultra-Orthodox affairs – which further 
drives their autonomy within the state. Traditionally, 
the chair of the Knesset finance committee is also 
Haredi. 
The second subject is the relationship between 
state and religion and the Jewish identity of the state, 
which was first referred to in a coalition agreement 
in 2001. The Status Quo is treated in great detail each 
time. Haredi efforts to assert their own prerogative to 
interpret this issue can be seen, inter alia, in several 
clauses on the Shabbat (usually concerning trading, 
traffic, work activities), dietary laws (kashrut), con-
version, and the role of Rabbinate courts. Moreover, 
since 1992 there has been a clause in every coalition 
agreement instituting unanimous decision-making 
within the coalition for all matters concerning reli-
gion and the state, which de facto accords the Hare-
dim a right of veto. They have also succeeded in 
establishing hegemony in the important religious 
institutions. All facilites that determine religious 
 
78 All coalition agreements can be found [in Hebr.] on 
the Knesset website: https://tinyurl.com/y2s79avh (accessed 
18 June 2020). 
life within the state of Israel to a greater or lesser 
degree are dominated by Haredim.79 
The third subject is relatively recent and concerns 
the adaptation of frameworks in the public sphere 
to ultra-Orthodox needs. Since 2006 there have also 
been clauses in the coalition agreements specifying 
that interference with the ultra-Orthodox lifestyle 
must be avoided, and that neighbourhoods must be 
expressly designated for ultra-Orthodox communities 
or new towns must be built for them. These include 
a clause that first appeared in a coalition agreement 
in 2015 imposing the creation of places of work that 
are adapted to the specific religious needs of the Hare-
dim.80 Additionally, the most recent legislative period 
saw a large number of further proposals,81 such as the 
binding obligation to designate an eruv (an area in 
which carrying objects outside of the home is allowed 
on the Shabbat), motions concerning so-called Shabbat 
elevators (which automatically stop at every floor on 
Shabbat) or on the possibility of gender segregation in 
facilities and at events. A further sign of the changing 
social composition are draft laws for public centres, 
stipends and memorial days honouring deceased Torah 
Sages or for establishing a “Torah House” in Jeru-
salem. In future, there will no doubt be, alongside the 
many public amenities named after prominent Zionists 
(the Shimon Peres Centre, Ben Gurion Airport, etc.), 
an Ovadia Yosef or Menachem Shach Centre for the 
dissemination of Torah knowledge. 
 
79 Dana Blandner and Itzhak Galnoor, The Handbook of 
Israel’s Political System (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), 747 ff. 
80 Likud and United Torah Judaism, Coalition Agreement on 
Forming the 34th Government of the State of Israel, 2015 [Hebr.], 
https://tinyurl.com/y444zz9f (accessed 18 June 2020). 
81 Instead of listing all legislative clauses separately here, I 
will reference the website https://mishmar.org.il/, where draft 
laws [in Hebrew] can be found organised by topic, person, 
party, etc. 
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The Key Position of Ultra-Orthodox 
Parties in the Political System 
Decisive for the Haredim’s influence is the key posi-
tion they have occupied since the 1990s between the 
leftwing bloc and the rightwing bloc. Although they 
only have about 10 to 15 percent of Knesset man-
dates, this position accords them disproportionally 
great influence and turns them into kingmakers. This 
is possible because the crucial line of conflict – how 
to deal with the occupied Palestinian territories – 
is of secondary importance for Haredi parties. The 
Haredim evade this question in favour of political 
flexibility. “Nobody knows,” according to UTJ Chair 
Litzman in a 2017 interview, “whether I’m for a terri-
torial compromise, or Eretz Yisrael Hashlema [Greater 
Israel], or if I support a two-state solution.”82 
Even though the Haredim tend to lean towards the 
positions of the Israeli right, they also back centre-left 
governments. Since 1990 all three of the governments 
not led by Likud came to power with the votes of the 
Haredim. However, this is also true for most of the 
Likud governments. Overall, the Haredim were not in 
government for only about five years since 1990; but 
they have participated in eight out of ten coalitions. 
Such involvement is essential for the ultra-Ortho-
dox, whose structures depend on the government’s 
policies. Funding and autonomy of their religious 
schools – the core of Haredi cultural identity – can 
only be secured through participation in government. 
This is also the case for their exemption from military 
service. A certain amount of political flexibility to pro-
tect their community is therefore necessary. 
Neverthless, since 2015 there has been a shift to 
the right among Haredi parties. They identified with 
the political right especially in the election campaigns 
of 2019 and 2020.83 That may limit future coalition 
building; however, given the rightwing/conservative 
majority that has consolidated in Israel in the past 20 
years, a continuation of Haredi participation in gov-
ernment is likely. 
Regardless, in the culture war, the lines of conflict 
are different. When aspects of the culture war came 
to dominate election campaigns, the Haredim found 
themselves in the opposition. 
 
82 Michael Tuchfeld, “I Won’t Say No to a Coalition with 
Gabbai”, Makor Rishon, 10 November 2017 [Hebr.]. 
83 Thus the Shas chairman can be seen alongside Netan-
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No Norms from outside the Torah: 
Against the Constitution and Supreme 
Court 
After 70 years of statehood, Israel still has no con-
stitution. The key issue of contention is that a consti-
tution is supposed to “articulate principles and values 
in which a society believes and which it wants to live 
by”. This has so far failed in Israel due to “differing 
views on the desired character of the state of Israel as 
a Jewish state”.84 
The Haredi parties have always rejected a constitu-
tion. No other issue presents the ideological diver-
gence between the Haredim and mainstream society 
so clearly. Ultra-Orthodox politicians emphasise that 
only the Torah can serve as a constitution: “Constitu-
tions made by humans have no place in Israel. If it 
contradicts Israel’s Torah, it is inadmissible, and if it 
is identical with Israel’s Torah, it is superfluous.”85 
This opinion from 1950 has outlived every discussion 
about a constitution. 
The conflict was evident during the three years 
(2003–2005) that the committee tasked with pre-
paring a constitution met. The Haredim representa-
tive, Avraham Ravitz, questioned both the principle 
of popular sovereignty86 and the definition of Israel 
as “Jewish and democratic”.87 The resistance of the 
Haredim was ultimately decisive in the failure of the 
 
84 “The Knesset as constitutive authority: constitution and 
basic laws”, on the Knesset website [Hebr.], https://tinyurl. 
com/y42wlve8 (accessed 18 June 2020). 
85 Meir-David Levonstein, 113th session of the First Knesset,  
7–8 February 1950, 744 [Hebr.]. 
86 Abraham Ravitz, Protocol of the Constitution Committee/ 
6523//Protocol no. 21 as of 1 June 2003, 28 [Hebr.]. 
87 Idem., Protocol of the Constitution Committee/6465//Protocol 
no. 11 as of 18 May 2003, 13 [Hebr.]. 
draft constitutions.88 Given the hopelessness of the 
enterprise, no further efforts have been made since. 
The Haredim are also critical of adopted “basic 
laws” which are akin to a constitution in nature. The 
Supreme Court extrapolated a right to judicial review 
from the basic laws “Human Dignity and Liberty” 
and “Freedom of Occupation”, passed in 1992, which 
makes constitutional lawsuits admissible. Given the 
fact that both these laws are classical liberal laws and 
that the Court bases many of its decisions partly on 
normative and emancipatory deliberations,89 this has 
led to conflict between the Haredim and the Court. 
And it is not the only such conflict. 
While the Court often takes the cultural particular-
ities of the Haredim into consideration, in many cases 
it also upholds complaints by institutions against ultra-
Orthodox practices, special rights or norms based on 
their influence. Thus the Supreme Court is funda-
mentally responsible for the fact that the exemption 
from military service enjoyed by the Haredim has no 
legal basis. It has variously ruled that the budgeting 
of ultra-Orthodox schools or their pupils violates the 
principle of equality, that the financing of the Haredi 
education system must be made conditional on its 
adherence to a core curriculum, and that the powers 
of Rabbinate courts must be limited. The Court has 
further allowed the import of pork, upgraded the 
legal status of non-Orthodox Jewish religious move-
ments, and adopted several decisions in favour of 
gender equality. On a number of occasions, it has 
also allowed the opening of shops and leisure facil-
ities on the Shabbat. 
 
88 Gideon Alon, “A Constitution for Israel? Not with This 
Coalition”, Haaretz, 18 January 2005, https://tinyurl.com/ 
y44uappe (accessed 18 June 2020). 
89 Menachem Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 143–57. 
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Zionism or halakha: 
what is the basis of Jewishness? 
Individual judges’ liberal interpretations of the 
law on the identity of the state have also contributed 
to exacerbating the conflict. For instance, the Court’s 
long-time chair Aharon Barak has declared that the 
Jewish character of the state should not be under-
stood to be religious. Rather, it is the “common uni-
versal rights of a democratic society, which developed 
in the Jewish tradition” that make the state Jewish.90 
In response to the “liberal terror”91 – as one ultra-
Orthodox newspaper dubbed it – the Haredim in 
collaboration with rightwing-conservative parliamen-
tary parties have for some time been trying to limit 
the powers of the Court. The most significant motion 
is a repeatedly tabled amendment to the basic law, 
known as the “Override Clause” (Pisgat HaHitgabrut), 
which would enable parliament to nullify by its own 
votes Supreme Court decisions and thus the Court’s 
status as the constitutional court.92 Some variants of 
the Override Clause would go as far as to render Court 
verdicts about decisions taken by the executive im-
possible, and thus largely suspend the separation of 
powers.93 There were heated debates on this during 
the last legislative period in particular. However, the 
plan foundered due to Kulanu, a temporary Likud 
splinter party.94 
From the Haredi perspective, the Override Clause 
cuts an overconfident liberal Court down to size. As 
staunch critics of a democracy that is liberal at its core, 
and in the absence of a religious state, they are work-
 
90 Aharon Barak, Constitutional Revolution, 31 f., quoted: 
Steven V. Mazie, Israel’s Higher Law. Religion and Liberal Democ-
racy in the Jewish State (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), 37. 
91 Israel Cohen, “A Harsh Attack on the Supreme Court in 
the Haredi Press: ‘Liberal Terror’”, Kikar HaShabbat, 13 Sep-
tember 2017 [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/y2s79avh (accessed 
18 June 2020). 
92 Michael Malchieli, “Basic Law Proposal on Human Dig-
nity and Liberty (Correction – Override clause)”, 12 March 
2018, https://tinyurl.com/y8ucpnn7 (accessed 18 June 2020).  
93 Alon Harel, “The Israeli Override Clause and the Future 
of Israeli Democracy”, Verfassungsblog, 15 May 2018, https:// 
tinyurl.com/y7gvuhk7 (accessed 18 June 2020). 
94 Peter Lintl, “Israel on Its Way to a Majoritarian System? 
The Current Government’s Fight against Principles of Liberal 
Democracy, the ‘Constitutional Revolution’ and the Supreme 
Court”, Israeli European Policy Network Papers 2018, https:// 
tinyurl.com/yd33fh85 (accessed 18 June 2020). 
ing towards an interpretation of democracy that fol-
lows purely procedural and majoritarian principles. 
Despite their generally hostile attitude towards 
constitutional state laws, the Haredim first submitted 
their own proposals for basic laws in the 2010s. These 
concerned compulsory Torah studies for everyone and 
permanently anchoring the Status Quo in the rela-
tionship between the ultra-Orthodox and the state. 
The Haredim even ultimately agreed to the so-called 
nation-state law,95 which defines Israel as a Jewish 
nation-state, after they had been assured that it would 
have no negative consequences on the Status Quo. 
An extra-parliamentary motion by an ultra-Orthodox 
think tank for embedding the sovereignty of the 
Torah in basic law96 was mostly symbolic in nature – 
nevertheless, this too is a sign of advancing political 
integration. In other words, beyond attempts to neu-
tralise any normative legal definition of the constitu-
tional state that contradicts the ultra-Orthodox world-
view, the Haredim have taken the first steps to embed 
their own interpretation of Jewishness in Israel’s 
constitutional make up. 
Custodians of the Relationship 
between Religion and the State: 
Conversion and Shabbat Rest 
The issue of “Jewishness” is closely linked to the ques-
tion of who is considered a Jew in Israel, and which 
institution has the right to decide. Under the so-called 
right to return and its secular-Zionist logic, anyone 
can immigrate who has one Jewish parent or grand-
parent. A Jewish spouse also confers that right. Under 
religious law, however, only those who have a Jewish 
mother or who convert to Judaism are defined as 
Jews. This means that not everyone who immigrates 
to Israel as a Jew is also recognised as such in the reli-
gious sense, a fact that causes problems with mar-
riages, divorces, births and deaths, since Israel has no 
legislation on civil personal status like marriage or 
divorce. It particularly concerns immigrants from the 
 
95 Peter Lintl and Stefan Wolfrum, Israel’s Nation-State Law. 
Netanyahu Government Lays the Foundations for a Majoritarian Sys-
tem, SWP Comment 41/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, October 2018), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/ 
publication/israels-nation-state-law/ (accessed 15 October 2020). 
96 HaRav Lord Jakobvits Torah Institute of Contemporary 
Research, Basic Law Proposal: The Sovereignty of the Torah (Jeru-
salem, 2004/5) [Hebr.], https://tinyurl.com/qwfb2ua (accessed 
18 June 2020). 
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Soviet Union, Ethiopia and the USA (who came into 
the country after converting to Reform Judaism, 
conversions not recognised in Israel). There are now 
about 400,000 (4.5 percent) so-called “non-Jewish 
Jews”97 in Israel. According to a report by the Prime 
Minister’s office, that figures is expected to rise to 
500,000 in the next decade.98 
It is often difficult to convert to Judaism since 
Israel only recognises the Orthodox conversion. This 
consists of a multi-year process during which poten-
tial converts and their families have to conduct their 
lives according to halakha and finally pass an exam 
in front of one of the Rabbinate courts, which are 
predominantly filled with ultra-Orthodox judges.99 
A simplification of conversion has so far failed due 
to the resistance of the Haredim, who use all means 
open to them – bills, ministerial decrees, the Chief 
Rabbinate and the Great Rabbinical Court. 
Perhaps the biggest controversy in this area was 
triggered in the 2000s by the attempt to offer a sim-
plified conversion process via a state agency (Maarach 
HaGiur). Staffed with national-religious rabbis, this 
authority did not report to the Chief Rabbinate but 
to the prime minister.100 The project’s explicit goal – 
its declared “national mission” – was to convert as 
many “non-Jewish Jewish” immigrants as possible.101 
After harsh criticism from the Haredim, the Great 
Rabbinical Court annulled thousands of these con-
versions in 2008 on the basis of a single case, from 
which the rabbis extrapolated that all conversions 
by the authority were questionable.102 The presiding 
judge insisted that this decision was necessary be-
cause, he claimed, those conversions would have 
 
97 Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, “Jews and Others: 
Non-Jewish Jews in Israel”, Israel Affairs 15, no. 1 (2009):  
52–65. 
98 Moshe Nissim, Conversion in Israel. Report and Recommen-
dations (Jerusalem: State of Israel, 2018), 65 f. [Hebr.], https:// 
tinyurl.com/yx8h5u84 (accessed 18 June 2020). 
99 ITIM, Guide to Converting to Judaism in Israel (Jerusalem, 
n. d.), https://www.itim.org.il/en/itim-guide-to-converting-to-
judaism-in-israel/ (accessed 18 June 2020). 
100 Netanel Fisher, The Challenge of Conversion in Israel (Jeru-
salem: IDI, 2015), 77 [Hebr.]. 
101 Michal Kravel-Tovi, “‘National Mission’: Biopolitics, 
Non-Jewish Immigration and Jewish Conversion Policy in 
Contemporary Israel”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 35, no. 4 
(2012): 737–56 (747). 
102 Netanel Fisher, “A Jewish State? Controversial Conver-
sions and the Dispute over Israel’s Jewish Character”, Con-
temporary Jewry 33, no. 3 (2013): 217–40 (234). 
endangered Israel as a Jewish state. Not Zionism 
(meaning the logic of the nation-state) but halakha 
was the basis of Jewishness, he stated.103 
This decision was annulled by the (secular) Supreme 
Court for procedural errors,104 but it had conse-
quences nevertheless: despite being state employees, 
some rabbis continued to refuse to recognise those 
conversions and privileged the decision of the Great 
Rabbinical Court over that of the Supreme Court.105 
The government again attempted to simplify the 
conversion process when the Haredim were in oppo-
sition from 2013 to 2015. It passed a law to add local 
rabbinical tribunals that were not exclusively staffed 
by ultra-Orthodox judges to the four state conversion 
courts (which answer directly to the two Chief Rabbis). 
The Chief Rabbis subsequently declared that strictly 
halakhic criteria continued to be decisive and that 
they had the authority to prevent simplified conver-
sions.106 The law was then changed in their direction 
during the next legislative period, when the Haredim 
were in government again.107 
On this issue, the ultra-Orthodox claim to power 
also stretches beyond Israel. The rabbinical courts 
only recognise a very limited number of conversion 
courts outside of Israel. This regularly leads to crises, 
inter alia with Jewish communities in the USA, which 
are predominantly made up of Reform Jews. 
Religious principles are gradually 
finding their way into the state. 
The issue of how to keep the Shabbat in Israel is 
no less controversial. According to surveys, a stable 
majority of 60 to 78 percent of all Jewish Israelis want 
to allow cafés, restaurants, shops, etc. to open and 
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local public transport to run on the Shabbat.108 Among 
secular Jews, the approval rate is usually over 90 per-
cent. The diametrical opposite is true of the Haredim: 
in all surveys, at least 90 percent reject Shabbat open-
ing.109 
Yet in the past few decades, certain sectors have 
been liberalised: cinemas, leisure parks, cafés, res-
taurants and even zoos have successively opened on 
Shabbat as well – at least in towns with secular 
majorities.110 The Haredim are fighting back, using 
state legislation. 
For instance, in 2014 when the secular city of Tel 
Aviv passed a bylaw to relax Shabbat opening times 
for supermarkets and kiosks, a lawsuit was filed by 
representatives of smaller shopkeepers, who feared 
losing clients to the large supermarkets since they 
themselves could not manage all the opening times. 
The Supreme Court confirmed the bylaw, pointing 
out that municipal regulations need to adapt to every-
day life.111 As a result, the ultra-Orthodox side tabled 
several motions to amend existing legal regulations. 
Finally, under pressure from the ultra-Orthodox a 
law was adopted empowering the Minister of the In-
terior – who is often from Shas – to override or 
reject bylaws concerning opening times.112 
The attempt in 2019 by Tel Aviv to operate public 
and free bus lines on the Shabbat was similarly at-
tacked. To date, only paying public transport is for-
bidden on the Shabbat.113 Moshe Gafni (UTJ) subse-
quently announced that he would introduce a law in 
 
108 Times of Israel (TOI), Staff, “Most Israelis Support 
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Times of Israel, 10 December 2019, https://tinyurl.com/ 
y4b73lgz (accessed 18 June 2020). 
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112 Lahav Harkov, “Knesset Passes Contentious Shabbat 
Law by One Vote after All-nighter”, Jerusalem Post, 9 January 
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the next coalition government prohibiting all local 
public transport on the Shabbat.114 
To what extent the state allows building works on 
the Shabbat is another contentious issue. In govern-
ment, the subject has repeatedly led to crises. Most 
recently, the trigger was work on the rail network, 
which was necessary for maintenance, according to 
the rail operator.115 The newspaper Haaretz claimed 
that the operator had proceeded in this manner for 
20 years116 – and that this had been tacitly tolerated 
by the Haredim. However, when reports appeared on 
ultra-Orthodox websites claiming that work contin-
ued on the Shabbat despite alleged orders to stop,117 
ultra-Orthodox leaders came under pressure. The 
result was a coalition crisis.118 Health Minister Yaakov 
Litzman (UTJ) resigned in protest. The crisis was not 
defused until working-hours legislation was amended 
so that every decision to do with allowing work on 
the Shabbat had to take into consideration the follow-
ing issues: is there an alternative to working on the 
Shabbat; and what does religious tradition say? Poten-
tial harm to resident communities also had to be 
considered. While this amendment to the law is ulti-
mately cosmetic, it does show how religious princi-
ples are gradually entering the state. 
Defending their Community under 
Pressure: Military Service and the Educa-
tion System amidst Demographic Change 
Since 1992 the debate over the ultra-Orthodox exemp-
tion from military service has regularly caused politi-
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cal crises, dominated election campaigns and even led 
to the failure of a coalition in 2012. After the creation 
of the state of Israel, David Ben Gurion had exempted 
all ultra-Orthodox women and up to 400 Torah stu-
dents from military service so as to win over ultra-
Orthodox Jews for his first coalition government. The 
numbers of exempted men were continually raised 
until Menachem Being made all fulltime Torah stu-
dents not liable to military service in 1977 – a con-
cession to Agudat Yisrael in return for its entry into 
his Likud-led coalition.119 Due to the steadily growing 
Haredi population, the state has lost more and more 
recruits. Originally, the exemption from military 
service concerned 3.1 percent of all men of applicable 
age; in 1977 it was 8 percent; and in 2019 16 per-
cent.120 
This became a political issue around the turn of 
the millennium, though interestingly not primarily 
because of a lack of recruits or a potential impact 
on Israel’s ability to defend itself. Instead, the debate 
concerned unequal burden sharing.121 The ultra-
Orthodox objection to military service questions one 
of the fundamental agreements of Jewish Israelis: 
the social contract of the Zionist mainstream society, 
which views itself as a nation under arms. The debate 
therefore also has to do with issues of Israeli identity, 
citizens’ duties and societal solidarity.122 
And once again the majorities are almost mirror 
images of each other. While over the past 20 years a 
continuous and clear majority (just under 80 percent) 
of Jewish Israelis have called for compulsory military 
service for the Haredim,123 78 percent of Haredim 
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1999, Memorandum no. 53 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Stra-
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y568bcak (accessed 18 June 2020); Jeremy Sharon, “Four 
rejected the idea in 2017, only five percent approved 
and 12 percent approved on the condition that no 
Torah students would be drafted.124 Again and again 
the argument was advanced that military service was 
only being urged to force Israeli habits on young 
ultra-Orthodox Jews.125 
What is more important: 
the state or tradition? 
For Zionists military service is part of the raison 
d’être of a state that was founded to guarantee the 
safety of the Jewish people. Yet the Haredim insist 
that obeying the commandments and preserving 
tradition are more important than the state. They 
absolutely spurn the Zionist disdain (Shlilat HaGalut) 
for the pre-state Jewish exile culture, which for the 
Haredim is defining. During a hearing, a lawyer for 
the ultra-Orthodox parties articulated it thus: “If you 
see the state as the ultimate refuge, if you [...] view 
existing Israeli culture as superior to the despicable 
and dark culture of thousands of years, you cannot 
understand why the physical defence of your home 
country is not the most important of principles.”126 
In many ways, the political confrontation over 
military service is paradigmatic of the means by 
which the Haredim successfully defend their com-
munity, and of the reasons that make it so difficult to 
push through decisions against them – even if there 
was the theoretical parliamentary majority to do so. 
After Ehud Barak had taken up office in 1999 under 
the slogan “Am Echad, Gius Echad” (One People, One 
Military Service) with a view to obliging the Haredim 
to serve in the army, he found himself depending 
on their parties to form a coalition. The compromise 
solution (the “Tal” Law) clearly accommodated the 
ultra-Orthodox, but it was finally not adopted since 
the coalition broke apart after two years for other 
reasons. Likud under Ariel Sharon, previously in op-
position, formed a new coalition with the Haredim 
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and adopted more or less precisely the Tal Law that it 
had previously vehemently rejected.127 
However, that was not the end of the story. While 
the law created the basis for recruiting Haredim into 
the army, it contained no coercive measures for Torah 
students, in a concession to the demands of ultra-
Orthodox parties. This meant that until 2007 hardly 
any ultra-Orthodox served. Several lawsuits were sub-
sequently filed against the Tal Law, including by the 
Movement for Quality of Governance. After the court 
had allowed several transition periods for an amend-
ment of the law, it finally ruled in 2012 that due to 
the unchanged situation, there was still no equality 
in military service in terms of the principle of equality, 
and demanded legal regulations.128 This led to the 
Haredim being squeezed out of government from 
2013 to 2015. They had barely become part of a coali-
tion again, when the stricter legislation passed in 
their absence was largely struck down. Since the cur-
rent rules have, in turn, been nullified by the Supreme 
Court, further conflict between the Haredim and the 
Court is inevitable. 
Two observations should be made in this context, 
which raise the question as to whether the confron-
tations over military service are not in fact a form of 
shadow boxing. The number of drafted ultra-Ortho-
dox recruits has steadily been increased since 2007, 
but never above 10 percent (a maximum of 2,850) 
of the age group. The objective set by the legislative 
in 2012 of 5,200 per annum was never attained. 
Moreover, according to an investigative report, in 
the past few years the army has frequently quoted 
inflated figures on recruited members, and recorded 
many of them as Haredim when they were more 
likely religious Zionists.129 For – and this is the sec-
ond observation – the army leadership seems rather 
 
127 Ironically enough the new leaders of the Labour party, 
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reluctant to enforce military service on the Haredim. 
The hurdles and costs of integrating the ultra-Ortho-
dox into army service are high, and incorporating a 
population group against its will is virtually impos-
sible anyway.130 It is also questionable whether ultra-
Orthodox recruits are truly required from a security 
perspective, or whether numbers are sufficient with-
out them. 
As regards the Haredi education system, two areas 
are socially controversial: first, the status of the reli-
gious schools as (partly) state-financed institutions 
that simultaneously enjoy teaching autonomy with 
limited secular references;131 and second, state ben-
efits for adult fulltime Torah students, and the eco-
nomic consequences for the state of their deliberate 
joblessness. 
When a lawsuit was brought before the Supreme 
Court by a secular non-governmental organisation in 
1999 to implement the government’s duty of super-
vision over ultra-Orthodox schools, it triggered a 
conflict about the school system132 that subsequently 
unfolded much like the conflict over exemption from 
military service. The Supreme Court ordered the Minis-
try of Education to set out a core curriculum for secu-
lar subjects (mathematics, English, Hebrew, natural 
sciences, etc.).133 Initially, any decisions were delayed 
because there were ultra-Orthodox members of gov-
ernment.134 
After several litigations and postponements, the 
Court reached a verdict that forced the government 
to implement a core curriculum. Under pressure from 
the ultra-Orthodox parties, the law on “educational 
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establishments of unique cultures”135 was passed 
in 2008, which justifies new exemptions for their 
schools. During the Haredim’s years in opposition 
from 2013 to 2015, the discussion was reignited. On 
the urging of the secular party Yesh Atid, a core cur-
riculum with secular subjects was indeed implemented, 
with sanctions for noncompliance. The government 
also cut funding for ultra-Orthodox schools and stu-
dents by about 50 percent and rescinded related spe-
cial laws. When the Haredim re-entered government 
in 2015, they put the clock back again: the vast 
majority of obligations for a core curriculum have 
since been abrogated for all ultra-Orthodox schools, 
and funding has attained the status quo ante again.136 
Closely connected to this is the debate about ultra-
Orthodox men who devote themselves exclusively to 
religious studies and receive a state subsidy for it. 
According to the prime minister’s office, the income 
of these so-called kollel students corresponds to about 
80 to 110 percent of the minimum wage. A substan-
tial part comes out of the government’s coffers; the 
 
135 Knesset, “Law on Unique Culture Education Establish-
ments”, in Law Book 2173 – Knesset Israel, 30 July 2008 [Hebr.], 
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rest is financed privately.137 Today around 50 percent 
of ultra-Orthodox men depend on this aid, which 
means that the proportion of those in work has risen 
markedly since its nadir in 2002 (35 percent) but is 
still very low.138 However, even if a higher percentage 
of Haredim worked, the absolute number of kollel 
students would nonetheless rise. From 2013 to 2018 
alone, it rose by 30,000 to over 85,000.139 
Employment rates among ultra-Orthodox women 
are appreciably higher; during the same period, they 
rose from 51 to 73 percent.140 However, both rates 
are in sharp contrast to the employment rates of non-
ultra-Orthodox Jewish men (86.5 percent) and women 
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Source: table D/2: Employment of 25 to 64 –year-olds by population group and gender, 1995–2008 (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Insti-
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(81 percent) in Israel. Among other things, this has 
consequences for the lives of the Haredim. More than 
half (52.6 percent) live in poverty (national average: 
21.9 percent).141 Along with the Haredim’s low uptake 
of gainful employment, their inadequate training 
makes them ill-prepared for the job market and 
means that they primarily find work in the low-pay 
sector142 or part-time jobs.143 Having large families 
exacerbates the problem. According to an OECD 
study, ultra-Orthodox families with more than six 
children (average: 7.1) usually live below the poverty 
threshold even with median income levels and two 
earners – in other words, they are working poor.144 
The continuing inclusion of the 
Haredim comes with a cost for 
mainstream society. 
All of the above leads to social controversies. A 
majority of Israelis views the Haredim as a financial 
burden. In a recurrent survey, the Haredim are con-
sistently named the group that contributes the least 
to Israeli society.145 
Economic assessments also ring a warning bell. In 
its 2011 annual report, the state auditor estimated the 
total costs of the low employment rate to the Israeli 
economy to be four billion shekel (NIS) every year – 
about one billion euros.146 In July 2019 the Ministry 
of Labour expected the low employment rates of 
the Haredim to cost the economy 40 billion NIS per 
annum by 2030 (for a gross domestic product of 1,174 
billion NIS), assuming circumstances remained un-
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changed – extrapolated for 2065, it expects the cost 
to be over 400 billion NIS per annum.147 In the long 
term, the Israeli Central Bank even fears that the 
nation might go bankrupt.148 
Given this, there have been repeated political 
attempts to encourage the ultra-Orthodox to take up 
paid work through a mixture of negative incentives 
(reduction of child support, income supplements and 
other benefits) and positive incentives (negative in-
come tax, special work programmes, day care for 
children). However, sufficient room to manoeuvre 
politically only exists when the Haredim are not in 
government. It is therefore not surprising that the 
government has fallen far short of its target, formu-
lated in 2010, of getting 63 percent of male Haredim 
into work by 2020.149 
Yet there is a positive trend in the employment 
rate. This is also due to developments in the ultra-
Orthodox community: its difficult economic situa-
tion; a number of ultra-Orthodox sham students in 
religious schools (so-called dropouts); the increasing 
integration of the ultra-Orthodox into society; and a 
lessening of the feeling of existential threat have all 
resulted in a rethink within the ultra-Orthodox com-
munity. Whereas, in 2008, the director of a network 
of religious schools still declared that “the Jewish 
people and the world exist because of the Torah. [...] 
Work is not an option”,150 this perspective has be-
come relativised. Rabbis give young men looking for 
work their approval, sometimes openly, sometimes 
tacitly. Ultra-Orthodox parties now even call for the 
introduction of quotas for the Haredim in certain sec-
tors.151 However, they insist that workplaces must be 
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adapted to the community’s needs. The ongoing inte-
gration of the Haredim clearly comes with a cost for 
mainstream society. 
Confrontations over the Public Sphere 
Hitcharedut – Haredisation. This term is used in 
Israel to group together developments (and conflicts) 
connected to the fact that the ultra-Orthodox are 
leaving their customary districts and moving into 
non-Haredi areas. Until the late 1980s, most Haredim 
lived in Bnei Brak and Jerusalem (where about 40 
percent of them still live today). However, demo-
graphic growth led to an ultra-Orthodox housing 
crisis. Until 2035, there will be a shortfall of 200,000 
housing units for Haredi families, according to the 
Ministry of Housing and Construction.152 
Two possible solutions exist. One, building new 
ultra-Orthodox towns that are specifically designed 
for the needs of the Haredim and serve as a refuge 
from non-ultra-Orthodox society. The most prominent 
examples are the three towns of Beitar Illit (ca. 65,000 
inhabitants), Modi’in Illit (75,000) and Elad (50,000), 
where the ideal of a spatial and social-moral separa-
tion from the rest of society has been taken into 
account. Beitar Illit even advertised itself as the first 
town created for the ultra-Orthodox since “territorial 
separation is the most appropriate approach to 
maintaining an independent lifestyle”.153 This avoids 
confrontations between the Haredim and other 
religious currents; however, the number of working 
Haredim unequivocally correlates with the heteroge-
neity of the areas in which they live. In other words, 
the more homogenous local society is, the lower the 
percentage of those in work, the greater the poverty, 
and the more religious the canon of subjects offered 
at schools.154 
The second solution is to settle the ultra-Orthodox 
outside of their customary neighbourhoods or towns. 
Examples can be found in Ashdod, Netanya, Arad, 
Beit Shemesh, Safed, and Jerusalem. However, this 
often causes conflict with the long-established 
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struction Plan for Housing for the Ultra-Orthodox Sector (December 
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154 Regev, Patterns of Haredi Integration (see note 142). 
inhabitants over issues of integration, participation 
and public normativity. 
In Israel gentrification is often not to 
do with class but with religion. 
These conflicts follow two, usually interlocked, 
patterns.155 To begin with, the new arrivals largely 
seek to separate themselves from the surrounding 
society, sometimes by erecting dividing walls, fences 
and screens to keep the outside world out of sight.156 
Simultaneously, efforts are made to extend the 
separated space. This is backed by local politicians 
and national legislation enabling the Haredim to 
demand that municipal councils part-finance their 
schools,157 which slowly expands their sphere of 
influence. The publication of an investment plan on 
an ultra-Orthodox website caused a stir, which stated 
that “the ultra-Orthodox public no longer hides its 
intent of taking over secular neighbourhoods with a 
view to Haredising them”.158 
In many neighbourhoods, long-standing residents 
are indeed being displaced. A study of Jerusalem 
concludes that moving-away rates in a neighbour-
hood accelerate when the ultra-Orthodox population 
reaches about 12 percent.159 At that point social 
pressure grows to change one’s own perception of 
norms, and the structure of the neighbourhood 
changes. Facilities such as cafés, restaurants or 
cinemas lose customers and often have to close; 
simultaneously many companies avoid violating the 
ultra-Orthodox codex for fear of protests, vandalism 
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or boycott by the Haredim, which would cause 
considerable economic loss. For the journalist 
Shoshana Kordova, gentrification in Israel is not 
about class, but about religion160 – which emphasis-
es the significance of the culture war as a social 
conflict. 
The presence of women in the public sphere is 
particularly controversial. Wherever ultra-Orthodox 
communities establish themselves, public images of 
women are spraypainted over, posters call on women 
to refrain from wearing revealing clothing, and 
women may be assigned their own pavements. In 
extreme cases, they may even be attacked for non-
compliance with the rules. This process has become 
known in Israel as hadarat nashim (exclusion of 
women from the public sphere). 
The government’s aspiration to 
integrate the Haredim clears the 
path for gender segregation. 
Gender segregation has found its way into many 
areas, ranging from (so-called mehadrin) buses to 
cemeteries, private clinics, workplaces, public events 
and EL AL aircraft.161 And yet 79 percent of Jewish 
Israelis reject gender segregation in public spaces.162 
There have been successful lawsuits against many of 
these practices; nevertheless, it is noticeable that 
gender segregation is gaining ground despite the 
verdicts: for example by insisting that it is voluntary 
or sidestepping the issue by using private providers.163 
This process is being consolidated by the growing 
importance of the Haredim as potential customers: 
advertising strategies as well as companies’ business 
premises are adapted to the preferred gender roles of 
the ultra-Orthodox. IKEA, for example, has produced 
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a catalogue specifically for the Haredim, which only 
features ultra-Orthodox men.164 
Simultaneously the government’s wish for integra-
tion of the Haredim clears the path for gender segre-
gation. This is particularly true during military ser-
vice and in facilities for professional training, such as 
universities or colleges. They offer programmes which 
exclude women as students, teachers and lecturers so 
as to facilitate access to a professional qualification 
for ultra-Orthodox men. Almost all academic institu-
tions now have areas that are segregated by gender, 
including entrances, corridors and library times.165 
The army has banned female soldiers from certain 
military bases, which only wives are now allowed to 
access.166 In some cases, the Haredim refused to par-
ticipate in military events because female singers 
were booked to perform.167 
In sum, it is clear that these clashing conceptions 
of norms bring with them an enormous potential for 
conflict. This is particularly difficult where processes 
of displacement are triggered, perceived red lines are 
crossed, or fundamental rights are violated. Inversely, 
it is obvious that where integration is desired, con-
cessions have to be made to the Haredi conceptions 
of norms. The growing presence of the Haredim in 
Israeli society changes – almost automatically – 
norms of behaviour in the public sphere, and requires 
constant weighing up of the price that secular main-
stream society is willing to pay for the integration of 
the Haredim. 
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Haredi parties were long open to the idea of peace 
negotiations in the conflict with the Palestinians. 
Only during the past few years have they moved 
further to the right on this issue. 
The reticent position of the Haredim – especially 
the Lithuanians – is based on a theological premise 
from the time of Jewish exile, stipulating that Jews 
should not rebel “against the peoples of the world”.168 
Translated into actual politics, this meant respecting 
the United Nations (as representative of the “peoples 
of the world”) and especially the USA as the leading 
power. In this context, Rabbi Shach was explicitly 
critical of the building of settlements and the anne-
xation of East Jerusalem. He also backed the principle 
of “land for peace”, basing himself on the religious 
commandment to protect life (Pikuah Nefesh) – he 
was therefore willing to cede territories.169 The long-
time spiritual leader of Shas, Ovadia Yosef, also sup-
ported this principle and facilitated a coalition be-
tween Shas and Labour to adopt the Oslo Accords.170 
The Hasidic rabbis and the Agudat Yisrael party 
do not have a unified opinion on this matter, but a 
majority tends towards a rightwing/conservative 
position. 
The Haredim are moving to the right 
on the territorial issue. 
However, during this unresolved conflict, the 
Haredim have moved to the right, in keeping with 
large parts of Israeli society. Additionally, after the 
deaths of the influential rabbis Shach (2001) and 
Yosef (2013), settlements for the Haredim were built 
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or substantially expanded in the West Bank. Haredi 
cities are now the fastest growing settlements in the 
Occupied Territories. Shas in particular has had an 
ideological volte-face. Even though the issue of how 
to deal with the West Bank is still not its primary 
preoccupation, it supports Netanyahu and now advo-
cates an expansion of Israeli sovereignty over the 
Jordan Valley.171 
The parliamentary group United Torah Judaism 
currently excludes the possibility of returning terri-
tories since prospects for peace with the Palestinians 
are poor and distrust is enormous.172 However, this is 
not a rejection of the principle if the cession of land 
can protect Jewish life, as Knesset member Yaakov 
Asher explained in 2019.173 In many respects, the in-
fluential UTJ chairman and Knesset doyen Moshe 
Gafni in particular follows in the tradition of Rabbi 
Shach as regards the conflict. He has not shunned 
contact with the Left, either.174 Some of his stances 
would be unimaginable for rightwing politicians. 
“The Palestinians” he said in 2017, “were here before 
us [...], we have expelled them.”175 However, he too 
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recognises that the international situation has 
changed, especially since Donald Trump took office. 
In this context, the halakhic commandment not to 
rebel against the peoples of the world suggests a less 
conciliatory attitude towards the Palestinians.176 In 
the new coalition agreement, the Haredi parties even 
assure Netanyahu of their support should he decide 
to annex Palestinian territories. However, according 
to media reports, it was Gafni who was responsible 
for the proviso that the explicit consent of the USA 
must be obtained before any such annexation.177 
Apart from the territorial issue, the Haredi parties 
have for the most part good relations with the Israeli 
Arab parties. They even cooperate on various legal 
initiatives on religious, social or milieu-specific sub-
jects.178 At times, this is downright staged: in a speech 
that has since become well-known, Israel Eichler 
(UTJ), speaking in Arabic, expresses his solidarity with 
Israeli Arabs and in turn receives the thanks of the 
Arab Knesset member Ahmad Tibi in Yiddish.179 
What remains unclear is how the Haredim might 
position themselves in the future regarding the con-
flict with the Palestinians. There is a noticeable dis-
crepancy between political elites and their voters, 
whose views are much more radical: 59 percent want 
to see the Arabs expelled from Israel.180 Among other 
things, this seems to be a generational issue. The 
trend among the Haredim as in all of Jewish-Israeli 
society is: the younger, the further to the right.181 This 
can be seen in parliament too. The youngest Degel 
HaTorah delegate, Yitzhak Pindrus, positions himself 
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The Haredisation lamented by mainstream society has 
its symmetry on the ultra-Orthodox side, which one 
might call “Israelisation”.182 Since the turn of the mil-
lennium, this shift can be observed in part of the 
ultra-Orthodox population – the so-called new Hare-
dim – for instance, participation in cultural events, 
visits to cafés and shopping centres, or moving into 
mixed neighbourhoods. The employment rate among 
these men has risen, as has their willingness to accept 
secular subjects alongside Torah studies, to aim for 
academic degrees, to do military service and to use 
the Internet. Changes in this group are mainly – if 
not exclusively – responsible for the fact that un-
employment among Haredi men has dropped to 50 
percent since 2002 and, in parallel, the rate of full-
time adult Torah students has declined as well. 
Yet the “new” Haredim are by no means homog-
enous. Rather, they are a loose association of different 
actors united primarily by the desire for change. Esti-
mates of group size vary accordingly, ranging from 
eight to 30 percent of the ultra-Orthodox popula-
tion.183 
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The New Haredim have adapted to 
the circumstances. 
In some quarters, these signs are interpreted as the 
long-awaited transformation or modernisation of the 
Haredim. Academic and social commentators doubt 
that the Haredi social model in Israel is sustainable in 
the long term. Sooner or later, they claim, economic 
constraints and the processes of social integration will 
lead to a fundamental change in the Haredim. How-
ever, for the large majority of New Haredim the facts 
do not bear this out. The changes seem essentially 
due to the circumstances: their relative poverty; the 
loss of the ideal that everyone can become a promi-
nent Torah sage; the realisation that the state of Israel 
is not an existential threat; and certainly also the 
(partly enforced) opening-up through government 
measures or the Internet. 
And yet this group remains to a very large extent 
a part of the ultra-Orthodox world (only two to seven 
percent demand a radical break).184 Its members con-
tinue to see Torah students as the social elite and 
accept the rabbis’ claim to leadership. Even those 
who are critical are still caught in the patterns of the 
community: a head of a Haredi campus at an Israeli 
university, who thoroughly condemned the Haredi 
way of leadership, still hoped for his sons to become 
leading Torah scholars.185 It is not a crisis of faith 
either.186 Numerous women among the new Haredim 
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are not interested in changes to gender segregation 
or other gender-specific ultra-Orthodox practices.187 
Nevertheless, the rabbis – and through them, 
leading politicians – regard these developments 
critically, often even as a danger to the community’s 
integrity. To date, no well-known rabbi has sided with 
the new Haredim, even though the elite have made 
the first concessions towards exercising a profession 
and even stronger incorporation of secular subjects 
into the school curriculum. Without their support, 
however, the situation is difficult for the group. 
Nevertheless there is an unanswered question here: 
how sustainable will the rabbis’ authority be in the 
future? After the deaths of the outstanding leading 
figures Shach and Yosef, several rabbis claimed the 
role of leader, which has led to authority conflicts 
and splinter groups. The authority of the rabbinical 
Da’at Torah has been suffering ever since. 
The greatest challenge, however, comes from the 
Internet and new media.188 Due to the opportunities 
offered here for (relatively) uncensored expression,189 
a sort of ultra-Orthodox public sphere has been cre-
ated, in which political onions can be formulated. 
Despite the primacy of the rabbis’ opinions, the past 
few years have seen the first cases of agenda-setting 
in the media, to which ultra-Orthodox politicians 
have been forced to react. Examples include the above-
mentioned works carried out by the Israeli state rail-
ways on the Shabbat. This process of transition was 
captured in actu in a 2017 interview – which is thus 
a remarkable testimony of it – with the UTJ Knesset 
member Menachem Moses, who criticised the process 
to ultra-Orthodox journalists: “I cannot accept that 
you’re dictating the agenda to us. We have an agenda, 
given to us by the Council of Torah Sages.”190 
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Political Developments within the 
Ultra-Orthodox Community 
Beyond this,a further shift expresses itself in political 
differentiation on the issue of the role that the Hare-
dim should play within the state. While the sizes of 
the respective groups cannot be precisely known, 
three main trends191 can be heuristically identified 
in surveys and from analysing statements: isolation, 
integration, takeover. 
With likely more than 50 percent, the largest but 
shrinking camp follows the classical ultra-Orthodox 
model of isolation: no secular education system, 
hardly any Internet but for the most part kosher tele-
phones (with various restrictions on surfing the 
Internet and installing apps) and concentrating on 
a secluded lifestyle. The conviction in this camp is 
essentially that the Haredim should only conceive of 
politics as an instrument to defend their milieu and, 
where necessary, to maintain “Jewish-religious mini-
mum standards” within the state, and that they should 
otherwise distance themselves from state and society. 
According to ultra-Orthodox author and political 
advisor Avraham Kroiser, this would remain the case 
even if the ultra-Orthodox should one day be the 
majority of the population.192 From this perspective, 
social peace is safeguarded by neither side – the 
ultra-Orthodox on one side and all remaining Jewish 
Israelis on the other – intervening in the other’s 
autonomy.193 Hence serious proposals repeatedly 
emanate from this camp for minimising potential 
conflict by striving for substantial structural or even 
political autonomy for the Haredim within the state.194 
That does not mean that this group would not theo-
retically prefer a halakhic state as well – but it is a 
fairly distant hope rather than a political programme. 
The other two groups, integration and takeover, 
mainly came into being with the growing involve-
ment of the Haredim in public life. They resemble 
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each other in many respects, especially as regards 
their openness on questions of training and parent-
ing, non-ultra-Orthodox literature and entertainment, 
or gainful employment. But there is a difference on 
political issues. 
The first group sees itself increasingly as a part of 
the state and advocates social and political integra-
tion. One of its leaders calls for transforming “Torah 
extremism” into a Torah-based conservatism that 
permits a careful integration into the state195 but that 
also has to face up to citizens’ responsibilities. Hence 
what is required from Haredi parliamentary repre-
sentatives is politics for the common good, not only 
community politics.196 For this group, integration 
goes hand in hand with recognising democratic prin-
ciples and the diversity of opinion. 
The other group, however, has come to the dia-
metrically opposite conclusion, and advocates a “take-
over” of the state.197 Yes, it declares, political integra-
tion is necessary, but rather in the sense of the Hare-
dim influencing the state and its norms. While this 
group does not aggressively address the concept of the 
“halakhic state”, it does attempt to derive a political 
vision from the widely shared – if abstract – utopia 
of a religious state. There will be, according to one 
commentator on social media, a hard-fought war over 
normativity in the public sphere; for only if everyone 
keeps to religious minimum standards can the Hare-
dim participate in public life at all.198 Another rep-
resentative of this group has discussed the Haredim 
having every right to develop an ultra-Orthodox ver-
sion of the state, even if it runs counter to the concep-
tions of other citizens – after all, that is politics. He 
therefore demands that ultra-Orthodox politicians 
work to Haredise the public sphere, be it by applying 
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the “morals of the prophets” and principles of social 
justice, by partially validating religious laws in pub-
lic, or even by full control of the public sphere 
through halakha.199 Yet others insist that they first 
need to gain an understanding of how a state might 
be run from an ultra-Orthodox perspective before 
being able to conceive of the state as a political pro-
gramme.200 
Which camp will prevail? Will there be rabbis who 
formulate halakhic positions for integration and take-
over? These issues will decide the continued develop-
ment of the Haredim within the state and society – 
which will in turn have consequences for all of Israel. 
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The Haredim are changing the state of Israel – at 
times consciously and proactively, at other times 
simply by their physical presence in places where 
they were not previously present. Their way of life is 
increasingly impacting on the whole of society: since 
substantial numbers of men do not work, since only 
a few serve in the military, and since the Haredim 
have a different consumer culture than the rest of 
Israelis and the market is now adapting to it. 
All these facets are part of the Israeli culture war, 
which is fought over municipal politics as much as 
over principles concerning the identity of the state. 
This analysis has explored three areas of conflict to 
illustrate this. 
The first area concerns the Jewish identity of the state. 
Here, the ultra-Orthodox parties have developed, espe-
cially since the turn of the millennium, a new self-
image as defenders of Israel’s Jewish character. This is 
expressed, first, in attempts to prevent the state and 
its institutions from being legally decided by norms 
that contradict the Haredi worldview. The Haredim 
try to neutralise such projects, as can be seen in the 
debate over the constitution and basic laws, but also 
in their request for establishing a procedure that 
would allow Parliament to overrule the Supreme 
Court, which they perceive as too liberal. This is an 
attempt to push back the substantive liberal character 
of Israeli democracy in favour of a purely procedural 
democracy without normative foundations. Second, 
the Haredim have been trying – with some suc-
cess – to obtain political hegemony over the relation-
ship between religion and politics. As has been shown 
with the examples of Shabbat rest and conversion, 
they manage to impose their political convictions, 
often even against majorities, and/or prevent further 
liberalisation. 
The second area of conflict concerns the special 
rights of the ultra-Orthodox community to protect itself 
from the influence of the state, especially as regards 
military service, ultra-Orthodox schooling and the 
gainful employment of ultra-Orthodox men (from 
which about 50 percent of them refrain in favour 
of lifelong Torah studies). This leads to political con-
frontations not only over issues of fair drafting and 
fair distribution, but also over the economic conse-
quences for the state unless and until the percentage 
of Haredim in paid work rises markedly. Thus far, 
the Haredim have protected these special rights with 
remarkable success. But, as has also become clear, 
this success exclusively depends on their participation 
in government. 
The final area of conflict concerns normativity in the 
public sphere. The greater the ultra-Orthodox share of 
the population, the more the public sphere becomes 
an arena for confrontations over issues of identity and 
lifestyles. The examples analysed – the so-called Hare-
disation of residential neighbourhoods, and the de-
bate about the role and public visibility of women – 
show how society is changed simply by the presence 
of Haredim: in mixed parts of town, non-ultra-Ortho-
dox inhabitants are often pushed out, entertainment 
and cultural facilities are replaced by facilities of the 
Ultra-Orthodox community, and women are restricted 
in their freedom of movement. 
By their nature, the Haredim are a challenge to 
the Zionist self-image of the Jewish state: they put 
religious laws, instead of the nation, at the heart of 
Jewishness. Consequently even smaller conflicts 
quickly take on fundamental proportions since they 
become linked to both questions about the “right” 
way of life and issues of self-image, identity and the 
character of the state. This is also evident in attempts 
to settle conflicts by law: for the Haredim, state courts 
sui generis are a normative problem since their ad-
judications are not based on the halakha. The issue 
of the correct interpretation of Jewishness therefore 
permeates all areas of conflict. 
A further conclusion of this analysis is that main-
stream society is faced with a sort of aporia: if it does 
not try to integrate the Haredim, the conflict over 
their special rights will be exacerbated. If it does try 
to integrate the Haredim, this conversely means that 
Haredi norms will increasingly find their way into the 
life of society as a whole. 
The hope that the Haredim might change after 
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stream society has only been partly fulfilled. The 
clearest transformation can be seen in the phenome-
non of the so-called new Haredim – a heterogeneous 
branch that is open to gainful employment, secular 
education and participation in Israeli society. How-
ever, these trends are rarely accompanied by a fun-
damental shift in their ultra-Orthodox worldview. 
Nevertheless, there are divergent attitudes to the role 
of the ultra-Orthodox within the state. While the 
majority of the new Haredim continues to advocate 
isolation as a model for life, thus following the rabbis’ 
instructions, two (sub)currents call for stronger in-
volvement in the state. One is for integration and for 
moderating the “Torah extremism” adjured by some 
rabbis; the other supports a resolute politicisation of 
the ultra-Orthodox worldview in the sense of an ultra-
Orthodox conception of the state. However, both 
groups still await backing from the rabbis. 
In the context of the Haredim’s dynamic popula-
tion growth, their intrasocietal developments will 
be decisive for the future of Israel. According to Neri 
Horowitz of the Israel Democracy Institute, the issues 
are therefore not only how many Haredim there will 
be, but also which kind of ultra-Orthodoxy they will 
practice.201 
This also affects the extent to which their parties 
can still function as a unified bloc, and how the vot-
ing behaviour of the Haredim might develop. Further-
more, a not unlikely scenario is that the social conflict 
between the Haredim and the rest of Israeli society 
becomes so dominant that it replaces the other line 
of conflict – confrontation with the Palestinians. 
This would presumably lose the Haredi parties their 
key position as kingmakers of politically diverse coali-
tions. The culture war would thus gather momentum. 
What is clear already is that the fear of a religious 
takeover, let alone an “Israeli version of Iran”, is not 
justified despite all demographic projections. How-
ever, there is a persuasive case to be made for two 
parallel developments. One, Israel is likely to experi-
ence more pronounced pillarisation, with new secular 
and ultra-Orthodox regions and neighbourhoods. 
Two, the country will become more conservative and 
religious under the influence of the Haredim. This 
can be seen not only in politics, but also in public 
life. It is all part of the birthing pains of the “new 
 
201 Meirav Arlosorov, “15–18 Percent Leave the Ultra-
Orthodox World – But That Won’t Save the Israeli Econo-
my”, The Marker, 11 November 2019 [Hebr.], https://tinyurl. 
com/yc8x65fz (accessed 18 June 2020). 
Israeli order”. Its process of negotiation will accom-
pany us for a few more years. 
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